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This paper is included in the First Monday Special Issue: Music and the Internet, published in 
July 2005. Special Issue editor David Beer asked authors to submit additional comments
regarding their articles.
Since this paper was first published in 2002 there has been a constant stream of litigation 
surrounding P2P in the US and in other jurisdictions. In the United States, the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals controversially held that Grokster was not liable for contributory and 
vicarious copyright infringement. Justice Thomas of the Federal Circuit observed: "We live in a
quicksilver technological environment with courts ill-suited to fix the flow of internet 
innovation." The United States Supreme Court is due to hear an appeal by copyright owners 
against the Grokster decision in 2005. 
In Australia, litigation was initiated against Sharman License Holdings, LEF Interactive and 
Brilliant Digital Entertainment, as the controllers of the peer to peer network Kazaa. Again, 
media owners have emphasized that the network is a pirate bazaar. Global legal forum 
shopping is one of the intriguing aspects of P2P. We see the arguments of both sides, 
originally developed specifically for US deliberation manifest across the globe.
The Media naively ask whether there is any point in the Australian court considering these 
issues, given the litigation ongoing in the US. Here the US is seen as the world leader for legal
ideas surrounding P2P, with the currency in ideas about technology, innovation and growing 
the global information economy clouding appreciation of national sovereignty and the 
distinctiveness of local jurisprudence. This context makes an appreciation of the cultural 
uniqueness of the US views all the more important.
Rip, Mix, Burn: The Politics of Peer to Peer and Copyright Law by Kathy Bowrey and Matthew 
Rimmer
Whereas Lessig's recent work engages with questions of culture and creativity in society, this 
paper looks at the role of culture and creativity in the law. The paper evaluates the Napster, 
DeCSS, Felten and Sklyarov litigation in terms of the new social, legal, economic and cultural 
relations being produced. This involves a deep discussion of law's economic relations, and the 
implications of this for litigation strategy. The paper concludes with a critique of recent 
attempts to define copyright law in terms of first amendment rights and communicative 
freedom.
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The Story So Far
One thing that the Napster phenomenon brought unambiguously to the fore was the question 
of the politics of copyright law. Media sources publicised the complaints of defiant Napster 
users, supported by prominent "alternative" musicians. Copyright law disempowered creative 
talent and led to the ripping off of artists and fans alike, it was argued. The law entrenched 
corporate greed.
"Napster = piracy", claimed other musicians, music and film studios and labels. Copyright is 
the main way of encouraging investment in new artists, and simply allocates what is justly 
deserved. Digital piracy sponsored by unauthorised file sharing technologies forestalls the 
development of new media services, preventing consumers from getting the best possible 
legitimate access to digital media as well as damaging the income potential of past and future 
artists and the corporations that support them.
The battle was cast in oppositional terms. There is much slippage between positions, but the 
issue has been interpreted by academics and other interested commentators in terms of Users
v Owners [1]; Decentralized v Centralized Internet architecture [2]; Peer to Peer v 
Client/Server relations [3]; New Economy v Status Quo [4]. Copyright law, through regulation
of content, had a role in managing the relationship between these parties or perspectives of 
the digital agenda. However copyright has not been a neutral or disinterested mediator.
In the first round, copyright, through the courts, seemed to defeat legions of Napster users 
[5]. In finding Napster responsible for the copyright infringements mediated via its databases,
copyright took a stand not just against Napster and its free-riding users, but against the 
presumption of a technology standing outside of legal control. The law had a productive role 
to play in the development of the digital economy, and a disciplinary role with regard to unruly
digital practices.
However this attempt at affirmation of legal authority was soon to be challenged by new 
bolder technologies - Aimster, FreeNet, Morpehus, Grokster, KazaA - that rose in popularity to
take Napster's place. These new technology makers were "copyright aware" and, having learnt
from the Napster experience, presented a very different kind of legal challenge. Technological 
innovation, it was hoped, would stay ahead of the law and avoid copyright's clutches through 
the development of more decentralised and anonymous, globally disseminated, file 
distribution technologies. Neither national law nor any one organization could manage to 
control these chaotic networks for sharing files.
The legislature had already anticipated the need for more development of copyright law to 
keep pace with digital reproduction techniques. Using new anti-circumvention provisions [6] 
owners soon embarked on actions they hoped would eventually prevent the circulation of 
"unauthorised" computer codes, that is any code potentially capable of supporting copyright 
infringing practices. In these current rounds of litigation the new provisions appear to have 
some bite [7]. Owners are taking the upper hand. The anti-circumvention provisions seem to 
give owners the ability to police access to information about, as well as access to, the tools 
capable of distributing digital content. They will control the terms and conditions under which 
any user accesses "their" files.
In defence, peer to peer advocates have more than technical savvy in their armoury. The new
hope is that the constitutional right to free speech will trump this interpretation of the 
anti-circumvention provisions, and draw copyright into supporting a more technologically 
neutral line [8]. As Lawrence Lessig sees it "the future of ideas" is at stake. 
His latest book The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World [9] 
considers the state of innovation and creativity in these "reactionary" times. In a key 
statement Lessig considers the subtext of the advertisements from Apple Computer urging 
that consumers should "Rip, mix, burn", because "After all, it's your music". He seeks to 
explain the power of this commercial:
"Apple, of course, wants to sell computers. Yet its ad touches an ideal that runs 
very deep in our history. For the technology that they (and of course others) sell
could enable this generation to do with our culture what generations have done 
from the very beginning of human society: to take what is our culture; to "rip" it
- meaning to copy it; to "mix" it - meaning to reform it however the user wants;
and finally, and most important, "burn" it - to publish it in a way that others can
see and hear. Digital technology could enable an extraordinary range of ordinary
people to become part of a creative process" [10].
However, Lessig seizes on the irony that the very same machines that Apple sets to "rip, mix, 
[and] burn" music are programmed to make it impossible for ordinary users to "rip, mix, 
[and] burn" Hollywood's movies [11]. The problem is that software protects this content, and 
Apple's machine protects this code. Furthermore, Lessig considers the backlash against the 
notion that consumers should be able to "Rip, mix, burn". He observes:
"But just as the cusp of this future, at the same time that we are being pushed 
to the world where anyone can "rip, mix, [and] burn," a counter-movement is 
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raging all around. To ordinary people, this slogan from Apple seems benign 
enough; to lawyers in the content industry, it is high treason. To lawyers who 
prosecute the laws of copyright, the very idea that the music on "your" CD is 
"your music" is absurd ... [12].
You have no "right" to rip it, or to mix it, or especially to burn it. You may have, 
the lawyers will insist permission to do these things. But don't confuse 
Hollywood's grace with your rights. These parts of our culture, these lawyers will
tell you, are the property of the few [13]."
Lessig casts the conflict as one between "genuine" culture and passive consumerism, with the 
corruption of copyright law and its social objectives at stake. Perhaps a superior body of law, 
with more noble political aspirations, can save the day, and copyright law?
And so the battle goes on, with copyright law as the prize. However this is a prize never fully 
won. It is a protean creature, an uncertain character capable of fluctuating under pressure. 
For the winners, victories are small and incremental, and subject to the next technological 
assault. For the losers, there is always the possibility of another legal strategy, a different 
judge and court, and a new technical and legal issue. The politics of the law is always subject 
to dispute. The copyright battle may never end.
 
A Different Kind of Politics
This paper critiques the way copyright law and lawyers have engaged with peer to peer 
technologies, identifying three distinct phases of development - Part One: Peer to peer. The 
Napster experience; Part Two: The DMCA litigation. DeCSS and Beyond; and, Part Three: 
Dmitry, the con and the Constitution.
The writing is sympathetic to analyses that fear the social costs of recent developments in 
copyright law [14]. Predictions include a diminishing of the space for creative cultural 
exchanges and free scientific communications, greater surveillance of our cultural 
consumption, a stifling of technological innovation and the retardation of the digital economy. 
However the methodology takes a different view of the politics of the dispute, out of concern 
for the way in which the law's critics, in confronting the politics of the issue, are constructing 
the relationship between law and society.
Peer to peer supporters believe that they are engaged in a different kind of political practice to 
owner's organizations like the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). The latter's 
agenda is one of instrumentally using the legislature and the U.S. courts to advance their 
own, sectional interests. Their politics is a dirty, unwelcome intrusion onto the legal terrain. 
The academics, on the other hand, are not so engaged. They are speaking in defence, and are
merely seeking a restoration of the historically established legal order. In justification of their 
stance supporters often acknowledge the philosophy expressed in the intellectual property 
provisions of the American Constitution:
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8. The Congress shall have the power ... to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited time to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.
This clause, as subsequently elaborated in case law, legitimates the interpretation of copyright
as a limited and socially responsible property right [15], that is one that "balances" owner's 
and user's interests [16]. In this sense it is wrong to read their battle as one of "owners v 
users". Critics do not merely provide a voice for marginalised user interests. More importantly 
they speak as guardians of the spirit of copyright law, as it has been historically and judicially 
grounded [17].
There are strategic reasons for asserting the endorsement of constitutional framers and "key" 
decisions of the judiciary. However in broader terms, the stance involves a very problematic 
use of history and politics in the law.
The origins and purpose of intellectual property laws are cited in an attempt to put aside any 
questioning of their particular contemporary interpretation of the politics of the law. History 
and principle are on my side. This suggests that any position contrary to mine is subjective 
and destabilising. This strategy singularizes legal history. It "rips" the foundational principle 
from its historical context, compressing it into a simple, generalized ideal, emptied of the 
original political content. The politics behind the eighteenth century constitutional provision - 
seeking intellectual property rights that further an Enlightenment understanding of truth and 
progress - becomes a much less specific demand, such as "to promote Learning" [18]. This 
movement is permitted because the American Enlightenment condition [19] itself authorised a
forward looking, and utilitarian interpretation [20]. The point of the reference back is thus 
merely to authorise the new "mix", that is, whatever values related to "progress" that the user
desires. Perversely, a clause once rooted in the politics of the American Enlightenment now 
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authorizes a copyright balance that serves, amongst other things, a culture of postmodern 
appropriation.
This formulation endorses references to history and principle in the name of communicative 
freedom. But the purpose is actually to endorse one contemporary interpretation of copyright 
law and to disempower those with contrary views about its direction. The attempt is both to 
silence owners and attack the legitimacy of the unwelcome reforms by the legislature.
Twentieth century expansion of copyright law, justified in terms of keeping pace with 
technological change, is characterised as making too many ad hoc concessions to owners, 
with an improper level of attention to user rights [21]. The legislative agenda has been 
captured by Hollywood and other media interests, resulting in a lack of balance in 
deliberations. The solution to this "corruption" is really to try and assert the superiority of 
common law over the Legislature. The common law, as represented by their particular reading
of the founders' philosophy and judgements that favour a "fair use" perspective, is less 
affected by money and politics. It is thus represented as a purer source of copyright law.
In jurisprudential terms this approach perpetuates myths about the order of the law, its 
politics and its relationship with society. The suggestion is that it is possible to accommodate 
copyright's proper balance, refine and redefine this over the centuries as is required, and at 
the end of the day achieve a coherent, internally consistent and rationally ordered body of 
law, that raises it above "dirty politics". This presents the values endorsed by the judiciary as 
somehow less "political" than those of the legislature.
Further in order to find "order" amongst the various paths available, it is necessary to 
disregard or discard provisions and decisions that fail to fit the chosen schema. Copyright only
looks (potentially) ordered and principled, because it has been flattened into this particular 
shape. This suppresses the reality of discontinuities in approach from the eighteenth century 
onwards. It has the potential to reduce the true complexity of the problems that copyright 
must manage, obscure the range of approaches that are available, as well as overstate the 
dimensions of any particular perceived problem. It is not the case that the future of the law 
has been set by the past, and that this destiny is imperilled by any particular decision.
Part of the reason law is so disorderly and difficult is because citizens make challenging legal 
subjects. Some are ignorant about legal matters, some disinterested, some are "too 
interested" and wanting to test legal limits, and use legal venues to gain some strategic 
advantage. Others act in apparent defiance of perceived legal commands. What is represented
in litigation is only a snapshot of the broader legal landscape, and this representativeness 
needs to be accounted for.
In copyright law the capacity for disorder is great, as the law has self consciously struggled to 
accommodate legal demands that have accompanied the development of different 
technologies. As Maureen Cain suggests, law works imaginatively, as "lawyers invent 
relationships" [22] to serve their client's needs:
"They invent categories and these categories are constitutive of the practices 
and institutions within which their clients achieve their objectives" [23].
New cultural forms, such as the Internet, suggest the arrival of new sources of capital anxious
for deployment in furtherance of our cultural "needs". If only copyright would protect digital 
goods "appropriately". Here capital is presented as pre-existing legal relations, as if it were 
already out there, an endangered species, slipping away because of legal inattention.
The legislature is expected to engage this capital. Copyright is supposed to provide "economic 
incentives" for cultural production. But in keeping with this broad justification the legislature is 
instructed to balance owner and user interests, in furtherance of the best interests of the 
development of the new cultural medium and access to the media. However the legislature is 
without the benefit of an established way of reading the cultural and economic dimensions 
associated with such new practices. In this context it is unsurprising that imaginative 
representations of the threat to capital in the form of visions of digital pirates or of an 
unenterprising colossus, flesh out the picture. Lawyers and legislators love to rescue the 
"victim".
The cultural specificity of the representation advanced is not necessarily obvious to those who 
advocate it, and to those wielding legal power, who engage with it:
"Gramsci argued that organic intellectuals maintain institutionalized or regular 
relationships with a particular social class, such that they are integral members 
of it and have regular experiential knowledge of that class and its problems. 
These are also their own experiences and their own problems demanding a 
solution ... they are creative. They develop new forms of relationship, new 
practices and, of course, new names for them and ways of thinking about them.
They literally think the advance of the class they are related to" [24].
Endorsing a particular view of the situation is not necessarily the result of "corruption", though 
it is problematic [25].
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If those whose views were ignored were "downsiders" with few institutions supporting them, 
the new "status quo" can quickly find roots. The copyright reform is uncontroversial and law 
seems to passively "reflect" the social order it helps construct. However when the 
"disenfranchised" are backed by a strong competing claim to capital, the juridical attempt to 
resolve the attendant problem is soon plagued with problems of legitimation that lead to legal 
instability.
New provisions were drafted to "save" a source of capital. However as soon as they start to be
utilised, the action begins to frustrate those with claims to a competing asset. These players 
are resourceful and lawyered-up. They are not willingly going to give away "their capital". So 
there is litigation, more litigation, other kinds of challenges and "public education". The 
refinement of the dispute leads to more specialist approaches - new categories, new 
exceptions, redrafting of principles. The end result is increased complexity in copyright law 
and disarray.
Over time a tumultuous episode in this history might be forgotten, particularly as the 
alternative claims to capital dissipate. In these circumstances the law can resume its 
appearance of good, rational order and harmonious social relations. But that order is always a 
facade that hides many alternate stories, conflicts and other paths.
In keeping with the above criticisms, the point of this paper is to bring to life the real 
complexity and messiness of the law, as it negotiates the peer to peer disputes and engages 
with conflicting views and cultures. The motivation is that of understanding how copyright law 
has managed its "representativeness" and the practical implications of the mismanagement of
social diversity. 
The methodology is one of looking at the law creatively, that is to try and identify the social, 
economic and legal relations that copyright law produces. It is not presumed that there is or 
will be any end to this creative engagement with the law. It is not the property of any one 
side nor exhausted at any stage. In this light though the saga below progresses in three parts.
What is interesting is how the copyright story has already been transformed, and how much it
has remained the same.
 
Part One - Peer To Peer: The Napster Experience
Peer To Peer Networks
Peer to peer is a class of computer applications that turn Internet-connected PCs into 
resources other Internet-connected PCs can access. Before peer to peer, if you wanted to 
serve files from your PC you needed a permanent IP address, domain name, registration with 
DNS servers and properly configured Web server software on the PC. With peer to peer 
technology your computer storage, cycles and content are made available because the PC via 
modem becomes a node that operates outside the DNS system, having significant autonomy 
from central servers with the ability to be accessed by other users [26]. It is file sharing on 
the Internet that occurs outside of the traditional forms of file transfer -- http and ftp. There is 
some centralisation that allows the network to function, however applications differ in this 
regard. At its simplest peer to peer creates an alternate file trading channel to the Web or a 
black market where what is traded is "free" but users of the network are subjected to shared 
codes of conduct.
Historical explanations for its development point to the Internet's militaristic origins - the 
desire to create a decentralised communications network for a post-apocalyptic world where 
any localised failure can be overcome by removing reliance on an intermediary server [27]. 
More current sociological explanations of peer to peer's popularity point to frustration at the 
way PC use has come to be controlled by plodding IT nerds at work, at universities and via 
ISPs. These IT experts decide the terms of your engagement with technology and other users,
motivated by their own interest in an easy life and pleasing the CEO with the stability and 
security of their unadventurous IT systems [28]. Peer to peer can cut such intermediaries out 
of the technological loop.
The legal interest in peer to peer revolves around a question of law's service to economics - 
old commerce and e-commerce. As Larry Lessig explains:
"The Hollywood lawyers have noticed something about the Internet: it conflicts 
with something they value. That is control over music, films and other form of 
intellectual property" [29].
In the most notable, well publicised U.S. cases concerning copyright and the Internet, the law 
has protected the investments of the established media owners.
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Napster
The Napster technology, as a peer to peer system, avoided the problems of a corporation 
centrally storing and serving files. With Napster's software MusicShare, users connect to a 
Napster central server and the server catalogues the user's MP3 files, making the names of 
the files available to other Napster users. Desired files can be downloaded from a host user's 
PC by using the MusicShare search capabilities and requesting the selected file to be 
transferred. There was originally no technological or other checking of the legitimacy of files 
moved through the network.
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) filed suit against Napster Inc., 
operators of the Web site Napster.com, accusing them of violating federal and state laws 
through contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. The complaint describes the case 
as follows:
"Napster is a commercial enterprise that enables and encourages Internet users
to connect to Napster's computer servers in order to make copies of plaintiff's 
copyrighted sound recordings available to other Napster users for unlawful 
copying and distribution. Napster has thus misused and is misusing the 
remarkable potential of the Internet, essentially running an online bazaar 
devoted to the pirating of music" [30].
They also named a number of anonymous Jane Does - individual consumers who have been 
using Napster. Not only did the recording companies bring legal action against Napster, but 
they also brought legal action against Yale University, the University of Southern California, 
and Indiana University, alleging that they are complicit in music piracy. Press releases by 
artists such as Metallica and Dr Dre augmented the legal action against Napster.
In addition to complaint about direct lost sales and royalties attributable to potential 
consumers downloading MP3 files for free using Napster, it was alleged that Napster was 
undermining the future of the recording industry. Recording companies support music 
production and distribution through their investment of substantial sums of money, time, 
effort and creative talent:
"Plaintiffs and their recording artists are compensated for their creative efforts 
and monetary investments largely from the sale of phonorecords to the public 
and from license fees for the reproduction, distribution, digital performance, or 
other exploitation of such phonorecords. Absent such compensation, profits and 
motivation are siphoned away from artists and record companies that record, 
manufacture, promote, and distribute those works. The pool of resources 
available for finding and promoting new artists shrinks, and sound quality and 
recording integrity are diluted and corrupted" [31].
"Legitimate" entrepreneurial development of commercial digital downloading markets is 
unsustainable in face of easy access to free download services:
"Napster is not developing a business around legitimate MP3 music files, but has
chosen to build its business on large-scale piracy. Napster seeks to profit by 
encouraging and facilitating the distribution and reproduction of millions of 
infringing MP3 files. Moreover, by deliberately refusing to maintain any 
information about its users in order to make copyright enforcement next to 
impossible, Napster has created a virtual sanctuary where music piracy can and 
does flourish on a monumental scale."
In the complaint references to "pirates" and the "bazaar" frame the role of law [32]. The 
bazaar as a foreign, unknowable and hence potentially dangerous creation, is contrasted with 
the potential of the "remarkable" Internet. But what exactly is remarkable about an entity 
whose future seems to have been already fully mapped? The Internet will have commercial 
music markets for MP3 downloads, developed in consultation with existing recording 
companies and their artists and available on their licensing terms. This future is apparently so 
close to being here that only a "virtual sanctuary" stands in the way. Here "virtual" refers to 
both Internet space and Napster's business practices such as the wilful "refusal to maintain" 
data the competitors desire. Law's role is cast as making the virtual concrete - making what 
we already know about the Internet fully arrive, forcing the competitor to conform in its 
business practices to those of the "real world" and transforming a mere market projection into
something more secure. Were law to act otherwise, law would be conspiring in an 
"illegitimate" future, in the sense that it would constitute misuse of an established nexus 
between capital and copyright law.
In granting the plaintiff's motion for an injunction Justice Patel found that Napster was liable 
[33]. She accepted evidence that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that 
third parties were engaging in direct copyright infringement by downloading MP3 files using 
the Napster service.
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In making her interpretations of fact and law Justice Patel adopted the characterisation of the 
issue very closely to the position as outlined in the original complaint. For example, the 
complaint:
"Plaintiffs have invested and continue to invest substantial sums of money, as 
well as time, effort, and creative talent, to discover and develop recording 
artists ... [34]"
is reproduced in the judgement as:
"The record company plaintiff's sound recordings also result from a substantial 
investment of money, time, manpower, and creativity ... In contrast, defendant 
invests nothing in the content of the music which means that, compared with 
plaintiffs, it incurs virtually no costs in providing a wide array of music to satisfy 
consumer demand" [35].
And
"The record company plaintiffs have invested substantial time, effort, and funds 
in actual or planned entry into the digital downloading market" [36].
The defendant had sought to "take over, or at least threaten, plaintiff's role in the promotion 
and distribution of music" [37]. Napster has raised "barriers to plaintiff's entry into the market 
for the digital downloading of music" [38]. Napster's own investment in digital download 
technologies and distribution models is completely discounted as a relevant contribution to the
music industry. It was not the "right kind" of contribution. The judicial view is that copyright 
law should serve a particular culture of expectation: the established industry's plans for 
development of the market.
Justice Patel found that the defendants had not established or met their burden of proving 
that they were entitled to the affirmative defence of fair use [39]. Most of the files moved 
through MusicShare software were infringing copies and Napster was well aware of that fact. 
Napster was a means for distributing pirated copies, not a mechanism for exercising fair use 
rights. Sampling, (whereby users try before they buy, akin to accessing an in-store CD 
listening post), space-shifting, (where, for sake of convenience, users would retrieve copies of
songs they already own for use on more portable media) and listening to authorised (as 
opposed to infringing) new works were judged not substantial non-infringing uses of Napster. 
Justice Patel also dismissed arguments about Napster users merely exercising home recording
rights. The scale of usage suggest it went beyond that permitted under the U.S. Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1992 and suggested users were overwhelmingly avoiding paying for songs 
that otherwise they would not have been able to access for free [40]. She disagreed that 
Napster was a mere Internet service provider entitled to "safe harbour" protection. Napster 
provided more than a "mere conduit" for transfer of files [41]. Documents showed that the 
defendant's executives knew "we are not just making pirated music available but also pushing
demand" [42]. She also rejected the notion that competition principles should limit the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, noting that most relevant case law dealt with 
impermissibly restricted licenses being granted to defendants, and not the case of unlicensed 
dealings in works [43].
Napster's defence, crafted by David Boies, the legal counsel who was successful in the 
Microsoft anti-trust case, sought to broaden the terms of this debate. He answered RIAA press
releases with his own media interventions, complementing court defences [44]. Drawing upon
his experience and involvement with the case of Microsoft, David Boies alleged that the RIAA 
were engaging in collusion in breach of United States anti-trust:
"Microsoft certainly has created more value. Microsoft built monopoly power, but
it did so by creating and developing. There isn't any product innovation in 
having multiple companies get together and decide jointly what they're going to 
do. The monopoly power of the RIAA comes purely from collusion" [45].
David Boies alleged that the record companies were guilty of copyright misuse:
"The 9th Circuit has made it clear that if copyright holders use their copyrights 
for anticompetitive purposes - to try to gain control over something they do not 
control directly through their copyrights - that's copyright misuse. It is clear that 
the RIAA has set out to control the Napster media. They have written 
documents saying that they want to shut Napster down and then take over the 
technology. The RIAA's members are acting in concert. They have pooled, 
according to their own statistics, 90 percent of the copyrights on music. All of 
those kinds of activities constitute copyright misuse. And if they are engaged in 
copyright misuse, they cannot enforce their copyrights" [46].
David Boies rejected the claim that the role of copyright law was to protect established 
commercial expectations:
"The law is designed to strike a balance between the interests of copyright 
holders on the one hand and the interests of consumers on the other. With 
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music, Congress has struck a balance to say that if there is commercial copying,
the copyright holder controls it, and if there is non-commercial copyright, the 
copyright holder does not control it. Is that the right balance? I think it's a 
pretty good balance ... We never would have passed copyright laws in this 
country unless we believed they helped consumers by generating creative 
activity. We know there needs to be a fair return to do that but we don't want 
excessive return, because the ultimate beneficiary is designed to be the 
consumer" [47].
His analysis interprets copyright law in line with broad cultural objectives, as well as economic
ones. This perspective was bolstered by academic support from copyright academics.
The amicus brief of copyright professors, lead by Professor Jessica Litman, sought to frame 
the dispute in light of the historical practice of copyright law and the objectives of the 
Constitution. Radio, television, photocopiers, analog radio and video tape recorders, cable 
television, fax, communications satellites, computers, digital audio, digital video and the 
Internet had all permitted new methods of copyright infringement and piracy. Nonetheless 
copyright law permitted these to develop:
"Courts responded cautiously to the claims that new technologies should be shut
down because they facilitate copyright infringement and rightly so. The 
Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright laws in order 'to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful arts' ... Outlawing a useful technology merely
because many people use it as a tool for infringement will rarely promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts. Only when the technology is not capable
of legitimate uses does it make sense to outlaw it" [48].
In enforcing rights the pre-eminent historical concern has been a social one- maintaining 
openness with regard to new technological developments: "the balance rests on the side of 
permitting new technology, not stifling it" [49]. Fair use, as elaborated in Sony Corporation Of
America v University City Studios Inc. [50] makes a space for new, potentially infringing, 
technologies. A technology should be permitted so long as it is capable of sustaining 
substantial non-infringing uses. Napster was capable of a number of non-infringing, 
non-commercial uses: listening to authorised works; sampling, which it was argued had the 
potential to increase CD sales; and space-shifting, such as downloading MP3 files at the office,
of music you already own at home. Napster was ignorant of the content moved via its system,
and should not be required to change the technology to aid the recording company's 
enforcement of rights.
Defence of Napster pursued a broader interpretation of copyright law, and whilst agreeing the 
law should encourage the development of new markets for creative and useful works, 
demanded that legal power be exercised in a technologically neutral way. Historically this goal
was of greater importance than protection of any individual rights.
The Court of Appeal sees its role as determining whether the court employed the appropriate 
legal standards:
"As long as the district court got the law right, "it will not be reversed simply 
because the appellate court would have arrived at a different result if it had 
applied the law to the facts of the case"" [51].
This jurisprudential responsibility was interpreted narrowly. The court reviewed legal principle 
within the framework chosen by Justice Patel, and without any direct address to this choice of 
politics. The exercise was one of checking for continuity in application of legal principle. That 
is, was her interpretation of fair use (§107) clearly erroneous, in the sense that it was not
clearly supported by precedent? They found her interpretations of §107 were not clearly
erroneous. It was agreed that Napster was liable for contributory copyright infringement. That
precedent may have also supported alternate readings and approaches to the issue was not 
addressed.
The only concession made to defence politics related to application of the Sony test, that 
where equipment was capable of infringing and substantial non-infringing uses, defendants 
should not be liable for contributory infringement. Justice Patel had failed to consider that 
Napster's architecture was capable of being used in non-infringing way, even though current 
use was improper [52]. Here Napster's executives clearly knew of their user's infringement of 
plaintiff's copyrights and they were still liable for that conduct, however the terms of the 
injunction granted were varied. Napster would not be shut down. It would be obliged to keep 
infringing material out of the system, to prevent viral distribution of these works. As the 
current architecture did not read the content of files moved through MusicShare, liability to 
remove access to infringing files depended upon reasonable notice being given of the 
existence of these files [53]. Compliance with this ruling has been subject to ongoing litigation
[54].
Only at the end did the Court of Appeals briefly address the defence's broader concerns. In 
response to the argument about abuse of market power it found: "There is no evidence here 
that plaintiffs seek to control areas outside of their grant of monopoly. Rather plaintiff's seek 
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to control reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, exclusive rights of copyright 
holders" [55]. These exclusive rights were read in microcosm - without reference to 
copyright's macro objectives, "balance" and commercial/non-commercial demarcations. 
Justice Patel's interpretation of §107 and related arguments were simply presumed to
incorporate the broad principles of copyright law, without there being any contextual 
discussion of them. First Amendment concerns were also briefly addressed so that it "was not 
reasserted on remand". The Court stressed: "We note that First Amendment concerns in 
copyright are allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine" [56].
In practical terms the Court of Appeal decision could be read as a victory for Napster. Napster 
was given the opportunity to "evolve" into a legitimate peer to peer system. However it was 
not widely read as such, because of the narrowness of the legal reasoning. The Court of 
Appeal persistently disengaged from elaborating a view about the politics of copyright law. 
The reality was that both Justice Patel's and Boies et al's approaches had historical support. 
However as both positions were arguable, legal authority could only endorse one, by not 
honestly engaging with the other. A legalistic approach was sought to provide closure to the 
reality of multifaceted legal and social relations. Here legal authority is vested in singularity.
This approach energised many technological challenges to legal authority. Developers would 
seek to outsmart overbearing and unsympathetic regulation. Gnutella, Madster/Aimster, 
Grokster, Morpheus, KazaA, FreeNet and numerous other peer to peer systems provide 
different technological frameworks and legal issues. For some the desire was to render law 
irrelevant and redundant through technological innovation. In an interview for Spin magazine 
Freenet's creator, Ian Clarke, explained his motivations:
"Milner: You've called Freenet "a near perfect form of anarchy". Given how 
enormous the Internet has become, is online anarchy such a good idea?
Clarke: By "perfect" I mean a well-planned, decentralized system. There are a 
lot of people now who have a stake in trying to control the Internet, so it's 
important to build systems that have no central control. If you look at Napster, 
for example, there are people who have central control, which means legal 
action can be taken against them. The owners of Napster could be bribed into 
selling it to the music industry. In order to make Freenet immune to that, I 
designed it so that it doesn't depend on any one person or computer. I don't 
control it. If somebody put a gun to my head and said: "Shut down the system",
I'd be unable to do it" [57].
Here regulation of any form is seen as bad. Regulation hinders innovation because it "knows 
best" by seeking to control the development, and furthering some interests at the expense of 
others. Developers think they know best, and if they're right, users will rush to take up the 
technology.
For others investing in peer to peer, the desire is more entrepreneurial:
"John Borland: What made you decide to buy Kazaa? What are your plans for
Sharman?
Nikki Hemming: ... my investors had been looking at opportunities in the 
Internet field. ... The company was actually started for the purpose of 
investment in Internet opportunities ...
Q: Were you able to shield yourself legally when you bought the original assets?
You're not being sued at this point.
A: ... obviously we were extremely pleased in March when the Dutch courts 
ruled that the KMD (software), which we owned, and the way that software 
functioned, was not infringing on copyrights in any way.
Yes, there is a risky profile, and I think that is the reality check of a new 
paradigm. If you are operating on the frontier, and you're operating as a driver 
in changes in technology, consumer behavior, and in what the commercial 
model looks like, then there are always inherent risks ..." [58].
The RIAA has threatened or initiated legal actions against many peer to peer developers, 
anarchist and entrepreneurial alike [59].
What is disturbing is the way the courts have permitted the RIAA to use law in a strategic 
fashion to control developments. Though given the opportunity to take control by judging peer
to peer technologies in terms of the broad foundations or objectives of copyright law, the 
courts have declined that challenge. Judicial passivity has played into the RIAA's hands, 
forestalling "unauthorised" peer to peer development, bankrupting companies backing them, 
and helping maintain the technologies as tools of the hacking underground. It is worth noting 
that the plaintiff's commercial peer to peer systems, much lauded by Justice Patel, are still not
operating in any significant fashion.
Nonetheless, Jessica Litman anticipates that the public will continue to ignore and resist the 
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legal regulation of their online practices:
"People don't obey laws they don't believe in. Governments find it difficult to 
enforce laws that only a handful of people obey. Laws that people don't obey 
and that governments don't enforce are not much use to interests that 
persuaded Congress to enact them. If a law is bad enough, even its proponents 
might be willing to abandon it in favor of a different law that seems more 
legitimate to the people it is intended to command" [60].
The glut of copyright lawsuits coupled with a submissive judiciary will only encourage more 
civil disobedience. Burdensome prescriptions and draconian penalties will harm the legitimacy 
of copyright law, and will foster non-compliance amongst large numbers of the population.
 
Part Two - The DMCA Litigation: DeCSS and Beyond
In the United States, Australia and elsewhere copyright owners were successful in creating 
new copyright offences - related to circumventing technological protection (anti-circumvention
provisions) [61] and disseminating decryption tools that could disable or avoid technical 
protection measures (anti-trafficking provisions) [62]. The provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) have been soundly criticised for a lack of balance:
"... by colorful use of high rhetoric and forceful lobbying, Hollywood and its allies 
were successful in persuading Congress to adopt the broad anti-circumvention 
legislation they favoured ...
Had the Administration sought to broker a fairer compromise between the 
interests of Hollywood and its allies and the interests of Silicon Valley and its 
allies, this process would almost certainly have produced better legislation than 
the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA" [63].
It is argued that the provisions exceeded WIPO requirements, were at odds with the broader 
stated policy of devising laws that foster a "predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple" 
e-commerce environment [64] and facilitated a "certain established but frightened copyright 
industries'" control over the design and manufacture of information technologies that can 
process digital information [65].
The anti-circumvention provisions can certainly be explained in terms of the wielding of 
political influence at the U.S. Congressional level. However beyond that kind of political 
explanation of the law, there is the politics played out in the way that copyright law has 
engaged with the new legal category and associated rights and restrictions. "Hollywood" 
couched the need for reform in terms of saving capital from seeping away through leaky 
digital pipelines:
"The protection of America's creative works is as "old as the Constitution." 
Valenti noted that a simple way to protect creative works is to "deploy 
technology protection shields ... on the World Wide Web. Technology provides a 
coded lock on the door to which entry is allowed only when permission is 
granted by the copyright owner." ... He cautioned that if intellectual property is 
"vulnerable to poachers, through unauthorized entry or copying, if they are not 
protected by simple, firm, clearly stated rules of the game, then ... we will laugh
loudly at our folly in the years to come" [66].
However the reforms did far more than simply provide for "locks" to protect content from 
"poachers". It transformed the nature of copyright existing in relation to copy-protected 
content. It created entirely new legal relations with respect to this subject matter, at odds 
with established rights and limitations. This can been seen in some of the high profile litigation 
enforcing the new rights.
2600 Case
In the 2600 case [67] eight U.S motion picture studios sued the defendants to prevent them 
electronically linking their site to others where the DeCSS code could be obtained. DeCSS is 
designed to decrypt the CSS encryption system on DVD players and allows a copy of the DVD 
file to be stored.
Rather than sue the offshore creator of the DeCSS code, the litigation targeted a few of many 
hundreds who had published information about the cracked code. The main defendant was 
eventually settled as Eric Corley. He was relatively well known in hacker communities by his 
Orwellian pseudonym, Emmanuel Goldstein. His profile stemmed from his ongoing 
involvement with the magazine 2600: The Hacker Quarterly founded in 1984, and the related 
Web site [68]. 2600 Enterprises Inc was also joined as a defendant. The choice of 2600 as a 
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litigant was not accidental. As many commentators liked to explain, the name 2600 was 
derived from the fact that hackers in the 1960's found that the transmission of a 2600 hertz 
tone over a long distance trunk connection gained access to "operator" mode and allowed the 
user to explore aspects of the telephone system that were not otherwise accessible. 2600 had
published articles on such topics as how to steal an Internet domain name, access other 
people's e-mail, intercept cellular phone calls, and break into the computer systems at Costco 
stores and Federal Express. The eight U.S. motion pictures wanted a high-profile target to test
the rules regarding anti-circumvention devices. They also sought to tap into public discourse 
about hackers as copyright pirates, criminals, and spreaders of computer viruses [69].
At the District Court Justice Kaplan found that, by first publishing the code on the 2600 site 
and also by hyperlinking from the 2600 site to other sites where it could be downloaded, 2600
was responsible for "trafficking" in copyright circumvention devices. He rejected the 
arguments of the defendants that the posting was legitimate in order to facilitate exercise of 
fair use rights, for example to facilitate the making of Linux compatible DVD players. First 
Amendment objections were also rejected [70]. These findings were affirmed on appeal [71].
Prior to the DMCA the dominion granted owners can be represented as follows:
 
Figure 1: Copyright relationships pre-DMCA
Illustration by L. Sharp
 
Copyright locates legal rights to cultural production within a system of interdependencies. It is
not really the case that copyright creates two competing domains - private and public. There 
is no private "domain" in a closed sense. The boundaries that exist are permeable. This is 
because ownership is determined by overlapping cultural limitations that express the realities 
of that copyrightable work's genesis, and enable similar relations with other cultural producers
to the benefit of cultural production generally. For example, fair use, taking of insubstantial 
parts, taking ideas but not the expression, and limits to the duration of protection all interrupt 
the owner's "domain". There are no "walls" around the copyrightable work in that property 
sense.
Nonetheless, in explaining the new rights under the DMCA, the courts make reference to the 
need to "target the circumvention of digital walls" [72]. This implies that the effect of the 
DMCA is to harden the membrane surrounding the copyrightable work, that is, to make an 
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Figure 2: Copyright relationships post-DMCA
Illustration by L. Sharp
 
The work itself remains defined in copyright terms in the same manner as previously, and it is
not that work's boundary that is changed by the DMCA. Rather under the DMCA the 
copyrightable work, once encrypted, is housed within a protective cocoon. It is the cocoon 
that does not allow for fair use in the ordinary sense [73], or other forms of dealings with the 
work, where decryption is required to enable access. "Defence" of the copyrightable work has 
led to the creation of an ancillary set of legal relations to do with the encryption process as a 
separate entity, unrelated to dealings with the encrypted content in the conventional 
infringing sense.
The owner's encryption code is actually protected functionally distinct from its relation with 
the copyrightable work. Through the new provisions, part of the owner's dominion now relates
to controlling the ability of anyone to develop and disseminate code that is functionally 
equivalent to the owner's own decryption code, whether or not that decryption code infringes 
the owner's code in its expression, and regardless of the reason for the development or use of
this "original" code. Thus the effect of the provisions is to create a monopoly that relates to 
the function of the owner's code [74]. This is radically at odds with copyright principles as 
historically established where, especially in relation to computer code, courts have strived to 
limit owner's rights to the expression and avoid monopolisation of the idea or function of the 
program. Under the DMCA encryption codes stand apart from any other code, because of their
usefulness to owners.
Further in interpreting a hyperlink to decryption code as encapsulating a form of "trafficking", 
the owner's dominion now extends far beyond any form of dealing with the protected content 
or the copyright work that is the encryption code. The provision restrains broader 
communications about this form of useful code. It thus entails a prohibition with respect to an 
area of discourse where that involves technical specificity about encryption codes. In this 
context, it is unsurprising that on appeal the discussion focussed on First Amendment 
arguments.
The appeal was supported by eight amicae briefs. In support of this strategy there was also a 
rise in the circulation of academic arguments about software as a form of expressive speech 
or dialogue, in an attempt to disrupt the current legal approach that sees technology as a 
functional tool or instrument in the service of a particular interest to found more a more 
permissive attitude to technological development and communications [75].
However, the courts were reluctant to accept such academic arguments. Justice Kaplan denied
that the DMCA should be read in the context of constitutional arguments about freedom of 
speech. He offered this stinging rebuke:
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"Society must be able to regulate the use and dissemination of code in 
appropriate circumstances. The Constitution, after all, is a framework for 
building a just and democratic society. It is not a suicide pact" [76].
On appeal, Justice Newman showed a greater delicacy in disposing of the constitutional 
arguments about the First Amendment. His Honour stressed that the Court faced an 
unpalatable, inescapable choice:
"This reality obliges courts considering First Amendment claims in the context of
the pending case to choose between two unattractive alternatives: either 
tolerate some impairment of communication in order to permit Congress to 
prohibit decryption that may lawfully be prevented, or tolerate some decryption 
in order to avoid some impairment of communication" [77].
In the end, Justice Newman stressed that the issues of public policy were best left to be 
solved by legislative response. His Honour was reluctant to consider whether the injunction 
was inconsistent with the limitations of the First Amendment.
Neither Justices Kaplan and Newman took up the issue of the relation between §1201 and
copyright law generally. The cultural considerations associated with copyright and assumed in 
its principles and logic, were only addressed in terms of a brief discussion of the relation 
between §107 and §1201, and then suspended. Justice Kaplan found:
"The policy concerns raised by defendants were considered by Congress. Having
considered them, Congress crafted a statute that, so far as the applicability of 
the fair use defense to Section 1201(a) claims is concerned, is crystal clear. In 
such circumstances, courts may not undo what Congress so plainly has done by 
"construing" the words of a statute to accomplish a result that Congress 
rejected ... " [78].
Justice Newman argued Congress had taken a "balanced approach" to fair use [79]. He also 
concluded "We need not explore the extent to which fair use might have constitutional 
protection ... such matters are far beyond the scope of this lawsuit" [80]. He found 
deficiencies in the defendant's claims and evidence justified his lack of consideration of further 
issues.
Thus Congress has determined the national priority as generally favouring protection over 
access rights, despite conceding some limited exceptions. This is taken as dispensing with the 
"management" of the cultural agenda of copyright. There is no perceived need to relate the 
new section to the body of law within which it is situated. Reasoning techniques such as 
references to inadequate evidence being brought by the defendant, or references to the 
alleged problem not arising in this factual situation, or technical issues of matters being in 
footnotes of the amicus brief, are used to "manage" the inconsistency.
There is thus continuity in judicial approach to that outlined regarding the Napster case. The 
"national" concern for "piracy" provides the narrative and justification for the decision to the 
extent to which these are elaborated. There is really only an external justification for the new 
provisions enacted by Congress. However this politics materializes in a new internal 
rationalisation for copyright law. In the treatment of "owner's rights" coherent legal definition 
is substituted by reference to metaphor. The historical reality of copyright as a limited and 
interdependent right is cast out by reference to a newly reified version - the "walled" work. 
This metaphor suffices as the new inner logic of the law. Law can "get by" with this sketchy 
analysis, by drawing upon both the expectation and experience of legal reasoning acting in the
service of capital, the "terror" of piracy erasing the possibility of a real competing claim.
The creative reinvention of the owner's domain creates a kind of monopoly in certain prized 
codes previously unknown to copyright and extends the owner's reach to activities far beyond 
direct or indirect dealings with protected content or distribution of infringing works. But 
scrutiny of the awkward fit of these new relations within the body of copyright law is averted 
by narrowing the judicial focus to particular technical matters, not requiring reference to the 
broader purposes, aims of principles of copyright law.
It can be argued that it is necessary to avoid this kind of legal inquiry in deference to the 
superior will of Congress. However even if that is so, that political reasoning will lose its 
relevance to the law with time. At that stage what will be referred to as the new 
jurisprudential grounding of these provisions? Will it mean copyright comes to have two 
conflicting paths - one set of legal relations defining non-encrypted content, and entirely 
different ones where encryption is involved? Judicial unwillingness to engage with the broader 
issues underlying the 2600 case could be explained in terms of judicial uncertainty about the 
future paths of the law. Who would want to claim authorship over a fractured body of law?
The Sony Hacker Challenge
That owners see their protected domain as including communications of a particular subject 
matter, and no longer in terms of works per se, can be seen from Ed Felten's case. Ed Felten 
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took part in a Sony-sponsored hacker challenge, where a $US10,000 prize was on offer to 
anyone who could successfully document how to break the Secure Digital Music Initiative code
(SDMI) [81]. Felten, Professor of Computing Science at Princeton University, succeeded, but 
he was not happy with the conditions of accepting the prize money, especially the 
confidentiality clause. As an academic he wished to discuss the code and his experience in 
breaking it. He proposed to give a paper on the subject at a conference. Under threat of legal 
action by the RIAA he elected not to give the paper, but sued the RIAA seeking a declaration 
that he was entitled to submit his paper to an academic conference without violating the 
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.
Unlike the 2600 case, here the affected party was a middle aged respectable academic 
seeking to participate in regular academic life in accordance with the established scientific 
practices of peer review and debate. It was argued that encryption experts and teachers 
needed to be free to discuss their skills and codes in order for better tools to be invented. 
Corporations are likely to sell "secure" packages but will never publicly disclose weaknesses. 
There is no reason to believe that the products will always perform as claimed in 
advertisements, or offer the best solution that is currently available. The public will end up 
being deceived and ignorantly trust insecure technologies in the absence of appropriate 
scientific review of such technologies.
The RIAA sought to have the action dismissed, arguing that it had no problem with Felten's 
paper. It had a strategic interest in stopping this action, because of the strong free speech 
concerns. Justice Garrett Brown of the District Court of New Jersey dismissed the action: "The 
plaintiffs liken themselves to modern Galileos persecuted by authorities. I fear that a more apt
analogy would be to modern day Don Quixotes feeling threatened by windmills that they 
perceive as giants" [82]. His Honour stressed that the defendants should pursue their 
"political, rather than a legal concern" in the legislature [83].
Citing assurances from the government, the recording industry, and a federal court that the 
threats against his research team were ill-conceived and will not be repeated, Edward Felten 
and his research team decided not to appeal the November dismissal of their case by a New 
Jersey Federal Court [84]. The government stated in documents filed with the court in 
November 2001 that "scientists attempting to study access control technologies" are not 
subject to the DMCA [85]. The RIAA echoed this, stating "we felt Felten should publish his 
findings, because everyone benefits from research into the vulnerabilities of security 
mechanisms" [86]. Princeton Professor Ed Felten said, "Although we would have preferred an 
enforceable court ruling, our research team decided to take the government and industry at 
their word that they will never again threaten publishers of scientific research that exposes 
vulnerabilities in security systems for copyrighted works" [87].
§1201(g) permits encryption research aimed at identifying flaws in encryption technology if
the research is conducted to advance the state of knowledge in the field. It is not yet clear 
whether those seeking to rely on the provision only have to fulfil a "genuine purpose" test, or 
whether the provision is also "status driven". Does research that "advance(s) the state of 
knowledge of the field" have to come from an acknowledged research institute? Felten, as a 
reputable researcher with established links with an elite educational institution had no problem
passing either genuine purpose or status tests. It seems more doubtful that contributors to 
2600, where postings expose flaws in encryption, would be entitled to the same protection
under §1201(g), because of the different social relations their communications enable [88]. If 
this is correct, then it seems the fair use exception establishes the majority as non-persons 
with regard to fair use, but privileges the few that limit their communications and activities to 
a "recognized" forum. You have to be a card-carrying member of the establishment, and 
confine your talk to those circles, if you want to break the code.
Taking heed of the advice of the courts, copyright users have pressed the Congress with their 
political concerns. Democrat Congressman Rick Boucher has proven to be sympathetic to the 
plight of Professor Felten [89]. He has called for a revision and rewriting of the DMCA. 
Boucher maintains that the defence of fair use should apply notwithstanding the technological 
measures provisions [90]. The Congressman also believes that Congress should reaffirm the 
principles of fair use in other specific areas - such as parallel importation, musical sampling, 
space-shifting, and making back-up copies of copyrighted data. However such reforms have 
thus far been disregarded and disdained.
 
Part Three - Dmitry, the Con and the Constitution
In the wake of the DMCA, copyright owners have not been content to rest upon their laurels. 
Senior Democrat Congressman Fritz Hollings has introduced the Consumer Broadband and 
Digital Television Promotion Act of 2002 into Congress [91]. Essentially, the bill would prohibit 
the sale or distribution of any technology unless it featured copy-protection standards set by 
the U.S. government [92]. Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association of America supports 
the Hollings Bill, calling it "a measure that will serve the long-term interests of consumers by 
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calling upon the Information Technology, Consumer Electronics and Copyright industries to 
negotiate in good faith to find solutions to digital piracy" [93]. The bill seeks to force 
manufacturers to embed technological measures in software and consumer electronics. In 
other words, it is a renewal of the battle between Hollywood and Silicon Valley, as noted by 
Pamela Samuelson [94].
The Hollings Bill has been greeted with some scepticism. The Bush administration has been 
quiet about the plan [95]. Copyright users are slowly becoming roused. As Declan McCullagh 
observes: "America's programmers, engineers and sundry bit-heads have not yet figured out 
how much a new copyright bill will affect their livelihood. When they do, watch for an angry 
Million Geek March to storm Capital Hill" [96].
In the meantime, copyright owners have continued to rely upon the DMCA in concerted legal 
action. The pattern of litigation is not accidental. Copyright owners have been targeting 
hackers on purpose because they are pushing a wider public agenda about stopping piracy. 
Furthermore, they are confident that their opponents have limited scope to make arguments 
about freedom of speech. The long-term strategy is for copyright owners to win favourable 
interpretations of the DMCA, which they can later assert against more formidable opponents - 
such as the computer software and consumer electronics industries.
A recent decision denying a motion to dismiss the indictment of Elcom Ltd. [97], the 
Russian-based employer of computer programmer Dmitry Sklyarov, for offences against
§1201, demonstrates continuity with the 2600 jurisprudence, and a refinement of that 
approach. Rather than acknowledge the creativity inherent in the provisions of the DMCA and 
the radical impact on existing jurisprudence, the court projects a facade of continuity with 
pre-DMCA law.
This legal action was initiated when Dmitry Sklyarov came to the U.S. to give a paper at 
"Defcon 9", an annual hacking convention. Sklyarov was author of the Advanced eBook 
Processor code (AEBPR), which was software that decrypted Adobe eBook files, turning them 
into standard PDF format files, free of eBook licence restrictions. Whilst the AEBPR software 
was legal in Russia, it could be purchased online and thereby was available to consumers in 
the United States. Sklyarov speech was about the poor security utilised in protecting 
electronic books and documents. He was arrested in the United States and has the dubious 
honour of being the first person indicted under the trafficking provisions of §1201. Later
Sklyarov was released from custody and allowed to return to Russia in exchange for testimony
in proceedings against Elcom Ltd. The lawsuit is continuing with Elcom Ltd as the main 
defendant.
The constitutional challenge to the indictment highlighted concerns about the effect of the 
trafficking provision §1201(b) on fair use. The ban with respect to circumvention tools went
too far, it was argued, because the section prevented any access to circumvention devices 
making it impossible to exercise traditional fair use rights. Fair uses are being treated by the 
legislation as if they were all infringing uses. It was argued that the provision was bad 
because it was unconstitutionally vague, constituted a content-based restriction on speech not
sufficiently tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and that Congress exceeded 
constitutional power in enacting the DMCA [98].
In rejected these complaints Justice Whyte argued that §1201(b) deliberately targeted
trafficking, and not the use of circumvention tools per se, and this was a concession to protect
fair use rights:
"Congress did not prohibit the act of circumvention because it sought to 
preserve the fair use rights of person who had lawfully acquired a work" [99].
He acknowledged that "engaging in certain fair uses of digital works may be made more 
difficult if tools to circumvent use restrictions cannot be readily obtained" [100]. However he 
argued the provision was not vague in relation to what tools were banned.
Justice Whyte recognised computer code as speech under the First Amendment, but found
that §1201(b) did not target speech. It targeted devices: "Congress sought to ban the code
not because of what the code says, but rather because of what the code does" [101]. He 
rejected the notion that it was impossible to regulate the functional aspects of the code 
without regulating the expressive (constitutionally protected) content of the code because:
"Divorcing the function from the message, however, is precisely what the courts
have done in other contexts, for example, in determining what portions of code 
are protectable by copyright and what uses of that same code are permitted as 
fair uses" [102].
The test of constitutionality was not "strict", because the code had both functional and 
expressive components, and the restrictions promoted a substantial government interest. It 
was a legitimate governmental interest to protect the "thriving electronic marketplace" from 
"the plague of digital piracy" [103].
That the provisions did not burden speech more than is necessary was evident from the 
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existence of the statutory exceptions. Further broader fair uses than those contained in the 
exceptions remained, because fair use itself was not banned, only devices that might enable 
it:
"Nothing prevents anyone from quoting from a work or comparing texts for 
purpose of study or criticism. It may be that from a technological perspective, 
the fair user m(a)y find it more difficult to do so - quoting may have to occur 
the old fashioned way, by hand or by re-typing, rather than by "cutting and 
pasting" from existing digital media. Nevertheless, the fair use is still available. 
Defendant has cited no authority which guarantees a fair user the right to the 
most technologically convenient way to engage in fair use" [104].
Further public domain works are not affected by the DMCA even though, via encryption, rights
to control a digital copy of such an unprotected work might arise. Public domain works, 
copyrighted works and fair use all exist with the same legal status as previously.
This characterisation is a con. Whilst legal relations continue as previously when rights and 
categories are viewed abstractly and independently, the DMCA disrupts the interrelationships 
copyright has traditionally maintained. That on paper the old categories of exclusive rights
(§106) and fair use (§107) still exist with the same legal definition does not mean that they
are the "same" rights, when viewed in the context of the interrelation between legal 
categories. Via the protection §1201 confers, §106 rights are enhanced, because §107 rights
cannot be meaningfully exercised without access to the locks that stand between works and 
prospective users.
It is possible to recreate a digital quotation of a literary work, but it is not so obvious how one 
is to reproduce more digitally sophisticated forms of expression such as artistic works, sound 
recordings or films. Fair use did not traditionally require "re-creation" of an original effort, 
although this process was certainly permitted. Fair use permitted duplication of certain 
portions for appropriate purposes. Duplication is now denied, regardless of the amount taken 
or reason for the taking, unless the user falls within one of the "special status" exceptions. 
Thus the problem for ordinary fair users, especially in relation to works other than literary 
works, is much greater than one of the DMCA creating mere technological inconvenience 
making the exercise of their fair use rights "more difficult".
It is a further ruse to deflect criticism of the concern for burdening the expressive content of 
code by reference to the copyright practice of "divorcing the function from the message". It is 
true that copyright law has established a distinction between the (unprotected) function of the
code and the (copyrightable) expression. However as discussed above, the code in issue here 
- encryption code - was explicitly excluded from these kinds of relations. The point of §1201
was to catch functional code, but not for the usual copyright case of keeping access to 
function free of copyright. Thus whether jurisprudence about not protecting functional code 
provides any guidance in identifying and protecting "expressive code" is highly questionable. 
The existing jurisprudence simply does not illustrate how expressive code remains free under
§1201(b).
So far, even when responding to constitutional arguments, the courts have elided discussion 
of the politics of digital copyright law, except through referral to Congress. The creative 
invention of new relations of "protection", out of step with the existing jurisprudence, has 
been largely denied. The courts have consistently rejected the notion that there are any 
significant "internal" housekeeping matters to consider, and close the possibility of reconciling 
the old law with the new provisions.
In the cases discussed it is widely anticipated that the "thriving electronic marketplace" will 
blossom due to the thoughtfulness of Congress and the usefulness of the DMCA provisions. 
Perhaps the fancy (or fantasy) is of suspending any practical discussion of status of the old 
rights and hiding the incoherency the DMCA has produced, in expectation that hard copies and
unencrypted versions will soon be replaced by certified, secure, protected copies [105]. Then 
a new copyright logic can emerge and supplant the older, "lesser" rights and confounding 
limitations on the owner's dominion.
In face of the current judicial intransigence, a move towards constitutional arguments to 
defeat the politics of the court, such as the assertion of fair use as a constitutional right, is 
understandable. However to date, so far as the DMCA provisions are concerned, the courts 
have also ignored the essence of that challenge.
It is worth noting that the courts have been happier to engage the emerging constitutional 
jurisprudence in relation to "cultural" arguments [106]. It could be argued that, in spite of the 
much vaunted ideal of technological neutrality, the courts are discriminating between different
forms of media. Judges are relatively comfortable in considering matters of freedom of speech
in the context of the act of publishing recognised literary works. However, they display a much
greater degree of hesitancy in applying constitutional notions of freedom of speech to 
exclusively digital media and modes of distribution - reflecting deep seated doubts as to 
whether computer code is equivalent to "literary" expression.
There may be something to "owner" calculation of the weaknesses of the free speech 
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defences. In touting free speech as a superior body of law to the DMCA, and in developing the
notion of free speech as an interior cultural motivation underpinning copyright, an analysis of 
the status of more conventional copyright principles seem to have fallen by the wayside. 
Incontestable copyright concerns such as for the idea/expression dichotomy, substantial part, 
limited terms and fair use, can, of course, be related to a free speech story. However they 
need not be. The apparent removal of these from current jurisprudence requires judicial 
account. Academic lawyers should be mindful of this conventional jurisprudential detail, and 
not allow it to be lost in the intellectual excitement of leading "emerging" jurisprudence, in a 
highly charged litigation context. Resistance to the new copyright status quo is particularly 
difficult, given law's deference to the service of capital. An overemphasis on "free speech", 
where there are doubts about the character of the "speech", pitches a weak notion of "culture"
against a strong, established but "vulnerable" notion of economy. Law can step in, in the 
service of the economy, to prevent "oppressive" and "unproductive" economic activity, but 
here "culture" runs interference in identifying the source of real economic oppression.
 
Part Four - Some Questions about Law, Politics, and the Politics Of Law
To date the authoritative story of peer to peer and the DMCA has shown:
reliance on legal authority vested in a singular perspective of the issues (the Napster 
experience);
refusal to engage with the implications of digital protection, outside of a one-sided 
preoccupation with the "culture" of "piracy" (The 2600 case); and,
a misleading assertion of jurisprudential continuity under the DMCA (Elcom Ltd).
Challenging this politics requires exposure of the law's mismanagement of cultural diversity 
and technological change. But in working towards this goal and the dislodging of the "new" 
legal status quo, it would be helpful not to repeat the same mistake of "ripping, mixing and 
burning" the jurisprudence.
The "continuity" and "coherence" needs of copyright law can be approached in the spirit of 
keeping the same questions alive, rather than pretending to invoke the authority of past 
answers. Answers for these times can be tested in light of their implications for diverse 
cultures. This differs from U.S. Congressional politics, in that there is a guardianship role for 
lawyers, committed to understanding past legal wisdom and not abandoning this wisdom too 
lightly, hearing all sides of the debate. That views on what is wise, and what is surplus, to law 
will differ is to be expected, and not feared, as currently, as a source of failure for law. The 
best that can ever be expected of law is an honest and reasoned engagement with what was, 
and what is, at stake.
At present, some of the better academic literature seems to pursue this kind of legal politics. 
Further the "end game" behind the current constitutional challenges to copyright law could be 
read in terms of a desire for a more open jurisprudence than is currently experienced. 
However when the arguments are readied for court, at face value they are more commonly 
expressed in terms of a closed and flattened jurisprudence. Perhaps this is because it is the 
language that the court system craves. However if this is the case, academic focus needs to 
move far beyond a questioning the politics of the U.S. Congress, peer to peer and the DMCA, 
and more firmly direct critical attention to the chosen jurisprudence of the courts. 
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Special Issue Update
This paper is included in the First Monday Special Issue: Music and the Internet, published in 
July 2005. Special Issue editor David Beer asked authors to submit additional comments
regarding their articles.
Since this paper was first published in 2002 there has been a constant stream of litigation 
surrounding P2P in the US and in other jurisdictions. In the United States, the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals controversially held that Grokster was not liable for contributory and 
vicarious copyright infringement. Justice Thomas of the Federal Circuit observed: "We live in a
quicksilver technological environment with courts ill-suited to fix the flow of internet 
innovation." The United States Supreme Court is due to hear an appeal by copyright owners 
against the Grokster decision in 2005. 
In Australia, litigation was initiated against Sharman License Holdings, LEF Interactive and 
Brilliant Digital Entertainment, as the controllers of the peer to peer network Kazaa. Again, 
media owners have emphasized that the network is a pirate bazaar. Global legal forum 
shopping is one of the intriguing aspects of P2P. We see the arguments of both sides, 
originally developed specifically for US deliberation manifest across the globe.
The Media naively ask whether there is any point in the Australian court considering these 
issues, given the litigation ongoing in the US. Here the US is seen as the world leader for legal
ideas surrounding P2P, with the currency in ideas about technology, innovation and growing 
the global information economy clouding appreciation of national sovereignty and the 
distinctiveness of local jurisprudence. This context makes an appreciation of the cultural 
uniqueness of the US views all the more important.
Rip, Mix, Burn: The Politics of Peer to Peer and Copyright Law by Kathy Bowrey and Matthew 
Rimmer
Whereas Lessig's recent work engages with questions of culture and creativity in society, this 
paper looks at the role of culture and creativity in the law. The paper evaluates the Napster, 
DeCSS, Felten and Sklyarov litigation in terms of the new social, legal, economic and cultural 
relations being produced. This involves a deep discussion of law's economic relations, and the 
implications of this for litigation strategy. The paper concludes with a critique of recent 
attempts to define copyright law in terms of first amendment rights and communicative 
freedom.
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The Story So Far
One thing that the Napster phenomenon brought unambiguously to the fore was the question 
of the politics of copyright law. Media sources publicised the complaints of defiant Napster 
users, supported by prominent "alternative" musicians. Copyright law disempowered creative 
talent and led to the ripping off of artists and fans alike, it was argued. The law entrenched 
corporate greed.
"Napster = piracy", claimed other musicians, music and film studios and labels. Copyright is 
the main way of encouraging investment in new artists, and simply allocates what is justly 
deserved. Digital piracy sponsored by unauthorised file sharing technologies forestalls the 
development of new media services, preventing consumers from getting the best possible 
legitimate access to digital media as well as damaging the income potential of past and future 
artists and the corporations that support them.
The battle was cast in oppositional terms. There is much slippage between positions, but the 
issue has been interpreted by academics and other interested commentators in terms of Users
v Owners [1]; Decentralized v Centralized Internet architecture [2]; Peer to Peer v 
Client/Server relations [3]; New Economy v Status Quo [4]. Copyright law, through regulation
of content, had a role in managing the relationship between these parties or perspectives of 
the digital agenda. However copyright has not been a neutral or disinterested mediator.
In the first round, copyright, through the courts, seemed to defeat legions of Napster users 
[5]. In finding Napster responsible for the copyright infringements mediated via its databases,
copyright took a stand not just against Napster and its free-riding users, but against the 
presumption of a technology standing outside of legal control. The law had a productive role 
to play in the development of the digital economy, and a disciplinary role with regard to unruly
digital practices.
However this attempt at affirmation of legal authority was soon to be challenged by new 
bolder technologies - Aimster, FreeNet, Morpehus, Grokster, KazaA - that rose in popularity to
take Napster's place. These new technology makers were "copyright aware" and, having learnt
from the Napster experience, presented a very different kind of legal challenge. Technological 
innovation, it was hoped, would stay ahead of the law and avoid copyright's clutches through 
the development of more decentralised and anonymous, globally disseminated, file 
distribution technologies. Neither national law nor any one organization could manage to 
control these chaotic networks for sharing files.
The legislature had already anticipated the need for more development of copyright law to 
keep pace with digital reproduction techniques. Using new anti-circumvention provisions [6] 
owners soon embarked on actions they hoped would eventually prevent the circulation of 
"unauthorised" computer codes, that is any code potentially capable of supporting copyright 
infringing practices. In these current rounds of litigation the new provisions appear to have 
some bite [7]. Owners are taking the upper hand. The anti-circumvention provisions seem to 
give owners the ability to police access to information about, as well as access to, the tools 
capable of distributing digital content. They will control the terms and conditions under which 
any user accesses "their" files.
In defence, peer to peer advocates have more than technical savvy in their armoury. The new
hope is that the constitutional right to free speech will trump this interpretation of the 
anti-circumvention provisions, and draw copyright into supporting a more technologically 
neutral line [8]. As Lawrence Lessig sees it "the future of ideas" is at stake. 
His latest book The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World [9] 
considers the state of innovation and creativity in these "reactionary" times. In a key 
statement Lessig considers the subtext of the advertisements from Apple Computer urging 
that consumers should "Rip, mix, burn", because "After all, it's your music". He seeks to 
explain the power of this commercial:
"Apple, of course, wants to sell computers. Yet its ad touches an ideal that runs 
very deep in our history. For the technology that they (and of course others) sell
could enable this generation to do with our culture what generations have done 
from the very beginning of human society: to take what is our culture; to "rip" it
- meaning to copy it; to "mix" it - meaning to reform it however the user wants;
and finally, and most important, "burn" it - to publish it in a way that others can
see and hear. Digital technology could enable an extraordinary range of ordinary
people to become part of a creative process" [10].
However, Lessig seizes on the irony that the very same machines that Apple sets to "rip, mix, 
[and] burn" music are programmed to make it impossible for ordinary users to "rip, mix, 
[and] burn" Hollywood's movies [11]. The problem is that software protects this content, and 
Apple's machine protects this code. Furthermore, Lessig considers the backlash against the 
notion that consumers should be able to "Rip, mix, burn". He observes:
"But just as the cusp of this future, at the same time that we are being pushed 
to the world where anyone can "rip, mix, [and] burn," a counter-movement is 
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raging all around. To ordinary people, this slogan from Apple seems benign 
enough; to lawyers in the content industry, it is high treason. To lawyers who 
prosecute the laws of copyright, the very idea that the music on "your" CD is 
"your music" is absurd ... [12].
You have no "right" to rip it, or to mix it, or especially to burn it. You may have, 
the lawyers will insist permission to do these things. But don't confuse 
Hollywood's grace with your rights. These parts of our culture, these lawyers will
tell you, are the property of the few [13]."
Lessig casts the conflict as one between "genuine" culture and passive consumerism, with the 
corruption of copyright law and its social objectives at stake. Perhaps a superior body of law, 
with more noble political aspirations, can save the day, and copyright law?
And so the battle goes on, with copyright law as the prize. However this is a prize never fully 
won. It is a protean creature, an uncertain character capable of fluctuating under pressure. 
For the winners, victories are small and incremental, and subject to the next technological 
assault. For the losers, there is always the possibility of another legal strategy, a different 
judge and court, and a new technical and legal issue. The politics of the law is always subject 
to dispute. The copyright battle may never end.
 
A Different Kind of Politics
This paper critiques the way copyright law and lawyers have engaged with peer to peer 
technologies, identifying three distinct phases of development - Part One: Peer to peer. The 
Napster experience; Part Two: The DMCA litigation. DeCSS and Beyond; and, Part Three: 
Dmitry, the con and the Constitution.
The writing is sympathetic to analyses that fear the social costs of recent developments in 
copyright law [14]. Predictions include a diminishing of the space for creative cultural 
exchanges and free scientific communications, greater surveillance of our cultural 
consumption, a stifling of technological innovation and the retardation of the digital economy. 
However the methodology takes a different view of the politics of the dispute, out of concern 
for the way in which the law's critics, in confronting the politics of the issue, are constructing 
the relationship between law and society.
Peer to peer supporters believe that they are engaged in a different kind of political practice to 
owner's organizations like the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). The latter's 
agenda is one of instrumentally using the legislature and the U.S. courts to advance their 
own, sectional interests. Their politics is a dirty, unwelcome intrusion onto the legal terrain. 
The academics, on the other hand, are not so engaged. They are speaking in defence, and are
merely seeking a restoration of the historically established legal order. In justification of their 
stance supporters often acknowledge the philosophy expressed in the intellectual property 
provisions of the American Constitution:
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8. The Congress shall have the power ... to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited time to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.
This clause, as subsequently elaborated in case law, legitimates the interpretation of copyright
as a limited and socially responsible property right [15], that is one that "balances" owner's 
and user's interests [16]. In this sense it is wrong to read their battle as one of "owners v 
users". Critics do not merely provide a voice for marginalised user interests. More importantly 
they speak as guardians of the spirit of copyright law, as it has been historically and judicially 
grounded [17].
There are strategic reasons for asserting the endorsement of constitutional framers and "key" 
decisions of the judiciary. However in broader terms, the stance involves a very problematic 
use of history and politics in the law.
The origins and purpose of intellectual property laws are cited in an attempt to put aside any 
questioning of their particular contemporary interpretation of the politics of the law. History 
and principle are on my side. This suggests that any position contrary to mine is subjective 
and destabilising. This strategy singularizes legal history. It "rips" the foundational principle 
from its historical context, compressing it into a simple, generalized ideal, emptied of the 
original political content. The politics behind the eighteenth century constitutional provision - 
seeking intellectual property rights that further an Enlightenment understanding of truth and 
progress - becomes a much less specific demand, such as "to promote Learning" [18]. This 
movement is permitted because the American Enlightenment condition [19] itself authorised a
forward looking, and utilitarian interpretation [20]. The point of the reference back is thus 
merely to authorise the new "mix", that is, whatever values related to "progress" that the user
desires. Perversely, a clause once rooted in the politics of the American Enlightenment now 
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authorizes a copyright balance that serves, amongst other things, a culture of postmodern 
appropriation.
This formulation endorses references to history and principle in the name of communicative 
freedom. But the purpose is actually to endorse one contemporary interpretation of copyright 
law and to disempower those with contrary views about its direction. The attempt is both to 
silence owners and attack the legitimacy of the unwelcome reforms by the legislature.
Twentieth century expansion of copyright law, justified in terms of keeping pace with 
technological change, is characterised as making too many ad hoc concessions to owners, 
with an improper level of attention to user rights [21]. The legislative agenda has been 
captured by Hollywood and other media interests, resulting in a lack of balance in 
deliberations. The solution to this "corruption" is really to try and assert the superiority of 
common law over the Legislature. The common law, as represented by their particular reading
of the founders' philosophy and judgements that favour a "fair use" perspective, is less 
affected by money and politics. It is thus represented as a purer source of copyright law.
In jurisprudential terms this approach perpetuates myths about the order of the law, its 
politics and its relationship with society. The suggestion is that it is possible to accommodate 
copyright's proper balance, refine and redefine this over the centuries as is required, and at 
the end of the day achieve a coherent, internally consistent and rationally ordered body of 
law, that raises it above "dirty politics". This presents the values endorsed by the judiciary as 
somehow less "political" than those of the legislature.
Further in order to find "order" amongst the various paths available, it is necessary to 
disregard or discard provisions and decisions that fail to fit the chosen schema. Copyright only
looks (potentially) ordered and principled, because it has been flattened into this particular 
shape. This suppresses the reality of discontinuities in approach from the eighteenth century 
onwards. It has the potential to reduce the true complexity of the problems that copyright 
must manage, obscure the range of approaches that are available, as well as overstate the 
dimensions of any particular perceived problem. It is not the case that the future of the law 
has been set by the past, and that this destiny is imperilled by any particular decision.
Part of the reason law is so disorderly and difficult is because citizens make challenging legal 
subjects. Some are ignorant about legal matters, some disinterested, some are "too 
interested" and wanting to test legal limits, and use legal venues to gain some strategic 
advantage. Others act in apparent defiance of perceived legal commands. What is represented
in litigation is only a snapshot of the broader legal landscape, and this representativeness 
needs to be accounted for.
In copyright law the capacity for disorder is great, as the law has self consciously struggled to 
accommodate legal demands that have accompanied the development of different 
technologies. As Maureen Cain suggests, law works imaginatively, as "lawyers invent 
relationships" [22] to serve their client's needs:
"They invent categories and these categories are constitutive of the practices 
and institutions within which their clients achieve their objectives" [23].
New cultural forms, such as the Internet, suggest the arrival of new sources of capital anxious
for deployment in furtherance of our cultural "needs". If only copyright would protect digital 
goods "appropriately". Here capital is presented as pre-existing legal relations, as if it were 
already out there, an endangered species, slipping away because of legal inattention.
The legislature is expected to engage this capital. Copyright is supposed to provide "economic 
incentives" for cultural production. But in keeping with this broad justification the legislature is 
instructed to balance owner and user interests, in furtherance of the best interests of the 
development of the new cultural medium and access to the media. However the legislature is 
without the benefit of an established way of reading the cultural and economic dimensions 
associated with such new practices. In this context it is unsurprising that imaginative 
representations of the threat to capital in the form of visions of digital pirates or of an 
unenterprising colossus, flesh out the picture. Lawyers and legislators love to rescue the 
"victim".
The cultural specificity of the representation advanced is not necessarily obvious to those who 
advocate it, and to those wielding legal power, who engage with it:
"Gramsci argued that organic intellectuals maintain institutionalized or regular 
relationships with a particular social class, such that they are integral members 
of it and have regular experiential knowledge of that class and its problems. 
These are also their own experiences and their own problems demanding a 
solution ... they are creative. They develop new forms of relationship, new 
practices and, of course, new names for them and ways of thinking about them.
They literally think the advance of the class they are related to" [24].
Endorsing a particular view of the situation is not necessarily the result of "corruption", though 
it is problematic [25].
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If those whose views were ignored were "downsiders" with few institutions supporting them, 
the new "status quo" can quickly find roots. The copyright reform is uncontroversial and law 
seems to passively "reflect" the social order it helps construct. However when the 
"disenfranchised" are backed by a strong competing claim to capital, the juridical attempt to 
resolve the attendant problem is soon plagued with problems of legitimation that lead to legal 
instability.
New provisions were drafted to "save" a source of capital. However as soon as they start to be
utilised, the action begins to frustrate those with claims to a competing asset. These players 
are resourceful and lawyered-up. They are not willingly going to give away "their capital". So 
there is litigation, more litigation, other kinds of challenges and "public education". The 
refinement of the dispute leads to more specialist approaches - new categories, new 
exceptions, redrafting of principles. The end result is increased complexity in copyright law 
and disarray.
Over time a tumultuous episode in this history might be forgotten, particularly as the 
alternative claims to capital dissipate. In these circumstances the law can resume its 
appearance of good, rational order and harmonious social relations. But that order is always a 
facade that hides many alternate stories, conflicts and other paths.
In keeping with the above criticisms, the point of this paper is to bring to life the real 
complexity and messiness of the law, as it negotiates the peer to peer disputes and engages 
with conflicting views and cultures. The motivation is that of understanding how copyright law 
has managed its "representativeness" and the practical implications of the mismanagement of
social diversity. 
The methodology is one of looking at the law creatively, that is to try and identify the social, 
economic and legal relations that copyright law produces. It is not presumed that there is or 
will be any end to this creative engagement with the law. It is not the property of any one 
side nor exhausted at any stage. In this light though the saga below progresses in three parts.
What is interesting is how the copyright story has already been transformed, and how much it
has remained the same.
 
Part One - Peer To Peer: The Napster Experience
Peer To Peer Networks
Peer to peer is a class of computer applications that turn Internet-connected PCs into 
resources other Internet-connected PCs can access. Before peer to peer, if you wanted to 
serve files from your PC you needed a permanent IP address, domain name, registration with 
DNS servers and properly configured Web server software on the PC. With peer to peer 
technology your computer storage, cycles and content are made available because the PC via 
modem becomes a node that operates outside the DNS system, having significant autonomy 
from central servers with the ability to be accessed by other users [26]. It is file sharing on 
the Internet that occurs outside of the traditional forms of file transfer -- http and ftp. There is 
some centralisation that allows the network to function, however applications differ in this 
regard. At its simplest peer to peer creates an alternate file trading channel to the Web or a 
black market where what is traded is "free" but users of the network are subjected to shared 
codes of conduct.
Historical explanations for its development point to the Internet's militaristic origins - the 
desire to create a decentralised communications network for a post-apocalyptic world where 
any localised failure can be overcome by removing reliance on an intermediary server [27]. 
More current sociological explanations of peer to peer's popularity point to frustration at the 
way PC use has come to be controlled by plodding IT nerds at work, at universities and via 
ISPs. These IT experts decide the terms of your engagement with technology and other users,
motivated by their own interest in an easy life and pleasing the CEO with the stability and 
security of their unadventurous IT systems [28]. Peer to peer can cut such intermediaries out 
of the technological loop.
The legal interest in peer to peer revolves around a question of law's service to economics - 
old commerce and e-commerce. As Larry Lessig explains:
"The Hollywood lawyers have noticed something about the Internet: it conflicts 
with something they value. That is control over music, films and other form of 
intellectual property" [29].
In the most notable, well publicised U.S. cases concerning copyright and the Internet, the law 
has protected the investments of the established media owners.
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Napster
The Napster technology, as a peer to peer system, avoided the problems of a corporation 
centrally storing and serving files. With Napster's software MusicShare, users connect to a 
Napster central server and the server catalogues the user's MP3 files, making the names of 
the files available to other Napster users. Desired files can be downloaded from a host user's 
PC by using the MusicShare search capabilities and requesting the selected file to be 
transferred. There was originally no technological or other checking of the legitimacy of files 
moved through the network.
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) filed suit against Napster Inc., 
operators of the Web site Napster.com, accusing them of violating federal and state laws 
through contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. The complaint describes the case 
as follows:
"Napster is a commercial enterprise that enables and encourages Internet users
to connect to Napster's computer servers in order to make copies of plaintiff's 
copyrighted sound recordings available to other Napster users for unlawful 
copying and distribution. Napster has thus misused and is misusing the 
remarkable potential of the Internet, essentially running an online bazaar 
devoted to the pirating of music" [30].
They also named a number of anonymous Jane Does - individual consumers who have been 
using Napster. Not only did the recording companies bring legal action against Napster, but 
they also brought legal action against Yale University, the University of Southern California, 
and Indiana University, alleging that they are complicit in music piracy. Press releases by 
artists such as Metallica and Dr Dre augmented the legal action against Napster.
In addition to complaint about direct lost sales and royalties attributable to potential 
consumers downloading MP3 files for free using Napster, it was alleged that Napster was 
undermining the future of the recording industry. Recording companies support music 
production and distribution through their investment of substantial sums of money, time, 
effort and creative talent:
"Plaintiffs and their recording artists are compensated for their creative efforts 
and monetary investments largely from the sale of phonorecords to the public 
and from license fees for the reproduction, distribution, digital performance, or 
other exploitation of such phonorecords. Absent such compensation, profits and 
motivation are siphoned away from artists and record companies that record, 
manufacture, promote, and distribute those works. The pool of resources 
available for finding and promoting new artists shrinks, and sound quality and 
recording integrity are diluted and corrupted" [31].
"Legitimate" entrepreneurial development of commercial digital downloading markets is 
unsustainable in face of easy access to free download services:
"Napster is not developing a business around legitimate MP3 music files, but has
chosen to build its business on large-scale piracy. Napster seeks to profit by 
encouraging and facilitating the distribution and reproduction of millions of 
infringing MP3 files. Moreover, by deliberately refusing to maintain any 
information about its users in order to make copyright enforcement next to 
impossible, Napster has created a virtual sanctuary where music piracy can and 
does flourish on a monumental scale."
In the complaint references to "pirates" and the "bazaar" frame the role of law [32]. The 
bazaar as a foreign, unknowable and hence potentially dangerous creation, is contrasted with 
the potential of the "remarkable" Internet. But what exactly is remarkable about an entity 
whose future seems to have been already fully mapped? The Internet will have commercial 
music markets for MP3 downloads, developed in consultation with existing recording 
companies and their artists and available on their licensing terms. This future is apparently so 
close to being here that only a "virtual sanctuary" stands in the way. Here "virtual" refers to 
both Internet space and Napster's business practices such as the wilful "refusal to maintain" 
data the competitors desire. Law's role is cast as making the virtual concrete - making what 
we already know about the Internet fully arrive, forcing the competitor to conform in its 
business practices to those of the "real world" and transforming a mere market projection into
something more secure. Were law to act otherwise, law would be conspiring in an 
"illegitimate" future, in the sense that it would constitute misuse of an established nexus 
between capital and copyright law.
In granting the plaintiff's motion for an injunction Justice Patel found that Napster was liable 
[33]. She accepted evidence that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that 
third parties were engaging in direct copyright infringement by downloading MP3 files using 
the Napster service.
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In making her interpretations of fact and law Justice Patel adopted the characterisation of the 
issue very closely to the position as outlined in the original complaint. For example, the 
complaint:
"Plaintiffs have invested and continue to invest substantial sums of money, as 
well as time, effort, and creative talent, to discover and develop recording 
artists ... [34]"
is reproduced in the judgement as:
"The record company plaintiff's sound recordings also result from a substantial 
investment of money, time, manpower, and creativity ... In contrast, defendant 
invests nothing in the content of the music which means that, compared with 
plaintiffs, it incurs virtually no costs in providing a wide array of music to satisfy 
consumer demand" [35].
And
"The record company plaintiffs have invested substantial time, effort, and funds 
in actual or planned entry into the digital downloading market" [36].
The defendant had sought to "take over, or at least threaten, plaintiff's role in the promotion 
and distribution of music" [37]. Napster has raised "barriers to plaintiff's entry into the market 
for the digital downloading of music" [38]. Napster's own investment in digital download 
technologies and distribution models is completely discounted as a relevant contribution to the
music industry. It was not the "right kind" of contribution. The judicial view is that copyright 
law should serve a particular culture of expectation: the established industry's plans for 
development of the market.
Justice Patel found that the defendants had not established or met their burden of proving 
that they were entitled to the affirmative defence of fair use [39]. Most of the files moved 
through MusicShare software were infringing copies and Napster was well aware of that fact. 
Napster was a means for distributing pirated copies, not a mechanism for exercising fair use 
rights. Sampling, (whereby users try before they buy, akin to accessing an in-store CD 
listening post), space-shifting, (where, for sake of convenience, users would retrieve copies of
songs they already own for use on more portable media) and listening to authorised (as 
opposed to infringing) new works were judged not substantial non-infringing uses of Napster. 
Justice Patel also dismissed arguments about Napster users merely exercising home recording
rights. The scale of usage suggest it went beyond that permitted under the U.S. Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1992 and suggested users were overwhelmingly avoiding paying for songs 
that otherwise they would not have been able to access for free [40]. She disagreed that 
Napster was a mere Internet service provider entitled to "safe harbour" protection. Napster 
provided more than a "mere conduit" for transfer of files [41]. Documents showed that the 
defendant's executives knew "we are not just making pirated music available but also pushing
demand" [42]. She also rejected the notion that competition principles should limit the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, noting that most relevant case law dealt with 
impermissibly restricted licenses being granted to defendants, and not the case of unlicensed 
dealings in works [43].
Napster's defence, crafted by David Boies, the legal counsel who was successful in the 
Microsoft anti-trust case, sought to broaden the terms of this debate. He answered RIAA press
releases with his own media interventions, complementing court defences [44]. Drawing upon
his experience and involvement with the case of Microsoft, David Boies alleged that the RIAA 
were engaging in collusion in breach of United States anti-trust:
"Microsoft certainly has created more value. Microsoft built monopoly power, but
it did so by creating and developing. There isn't any product innovation in 
having multiple companies get together and decide jointly what they're going to 
do. The monopoly power of the RIAA comes purely from collusion" [45].
David Boies alleged that the record companies were guilty of copyright misuse:
"The 9th Circuit has made it clear that if copyright holders use their copyrights 
for anticompetitive purposes - to try to gain control over something they do not 
control directly through their copyrights - that's copyright misuse. It is clear that 
the RIAA has set out to control the Napster media. They have written 
documents saying that they want to shut Napster down and then take over the 
technology. The RIAA's members are acting in concert. They have pooled, 
according to their own statistics, 90 percent of the copyrights on music. All of 
those kinds of activities constitute copyright misuse. And if they are engaged in 
copyright misuse, they cannot enforce their copyrights" [46].
David Boies rejected the claim that the role of copyright law was to protect established 
commercial expectations:
"The law is designed to strike a balance between the interests of copyright 
holders on the one hand and the interests of consumers on the other. With 
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music, Congress has struck a balance to say that if there is commercial copying,
the copyright holder controls it, and if there is non-commercial copyright, the 
copyright holder does not control it. Is that the right balance? I think it's a 
pretty good balance ... We never would have passed copyright laws in this 
country unless we believed they helped consumers by generating creative 
activity. We know there needs to be a fair return to do that but we don't want 
excessive return, because the ultimate beneficiary is designed to be the 
consumer" [47].
His analysis interprets copyright law in line with broad cultural objectives, as well as economic
ones. This perspective was bolstered by academic support from copyright academics.
The amicus brief of copyright professors, lead by Professor Jessica Litman, sought to frame 
the dispute in light of the historical practice of copyright law and the objectives of the 
Constitution. Radio, television, photocopiers, analog radio and video tape recorders, cable 
television, fax, communications satellites, computers, digital audio, digital video and the 
Internet had all permitted new methods of copyright infringement and piracy. Nonetheless 
copyright law permitted these to develop:
"Courts responded cautiously to the claims that new technologies should be shut
down because they facilitate copyright infringement and rightly so. The 
Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright laws in order 'to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful arts' ... Outlawing a useful technology merely
because many people use it as a tool for infringement will rarely promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts. Only when the technology is not capable
of legitimate uses does it make sense to outlaw it" [48].
In enforcing rights the pre-eminent historical concern has been a social one- maintaining 
openness with regard to new technological developments: "the balance rests on the side of 
permitting new technology, not stifling it" [49]. Fair use, as elaborated in Sony Corporation Of
America v University City Studios Inc. [50] makes a space for new, potentially infringing, 
technologies. A technology should be permitted so long as it is capable of sustaining 
substantial non-infringing uses. Napster was capable of a number of non-infringing, 
non-commercial uses: listening to authorised works; sampling, which it was argued had the 
potential to increase CD sales; and space-shifting, such as downloading MP3 files at the office,
of music you already own at home. Napster was ignorant of the content moved via its system,
and should not be required to change the technology to aid the recording company's 
enforcement of rights.
Defence of Napster pursued a broader interpretation of copyright law, and whilst agreeing the 
law should encourage the development of new markets for creative and useful works, 
demanded that legal power be exercised in a technologically neutral way. Historically this goal
was of greater importance than protection of any individual rights.
The Court of Appeal sees its role as determining whether the court employed the appropriate 
legal standards:
"As long as the district court got the law right, "it will not be reversed simply 
because the appellate court would have arrived at a different result if it had 
applied the law to the facts of the case"" [51].
This jurisprudential responsibility was interpreted narrowly. The court reviewed legal principle 
within the framework chosen by Justice Patel, and without any direct address to this choice of 
politics. The exercise was one of checking for continuity in application of legal principle. That 
is, was her interpretation of fair use (§107) clearly erroneous, in the sense that it was not
clearly supported by precedent? They found her interpretations of §107 were not clearly
erroneous. It was agreed that Napster was liable for contributory copyright infringement. That
precedent may have also supported alternate readings and approaches to the issue was not 
addressed.
The only concession made to defence politics related to application of the Sony test, that 
where equipment was capable of infringing and substantial non-infringing uses, defendants 
should not be liable for contributory infringement. Justice Patel had failed to consider that 
Napster's architecture was capable of being used in non-infringing way, even though current 
use was improper [52]. Here Napster's executives clearly knew of their user's infringement of 
plaintiff's copyrights and they were still liable for that conduct, however the terms of the 
injunction granted were varied. Napster would not be shut down. It would be obliged to keep 
infringing material out of the system, to prevent viral distribution of these works. As the 
current architecture did not read the content of files moved through MusicShare, liability to 
remove access to infringing files depended upon reasonable notice being given of the 
existence of these files [53]. Compliance with this ruling has been subject to ongoing litigation
[54].
Only at the end did the Court of Appeals briefly address the defence's broader concerns. In 
response to the argument about abuse of market power it found: "There is no evidence here 
that plaintiffs seek to control areas outside of their grant of monopoly. Rather plaintiff's seek 
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to control reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, exclusive rights of copyright 
holders" [55]. These exclusive rights were read in microcosm - without reference to 
copyright's macro objectives, "balance" and commercial/non-commercial demarcations. 
Justice Patel's interpretation of §107 and related arguments were simply presumed to
incorporate the broad principles of copyright law, without there being any contextual 
discussion of them. First Amendment concerns were also briefly addressed so that it "was not 
reasserted on remand". The Court stressed: "We note that First Amendment concerns in 
copyright are allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine" [56].
In practical terms the Court of Appeal decision could be read as a victory for Napster. Napster 
was given the opportunity to "evolve" into a legitimate peer to peer system. However it was 
not widely read as such, because of the narrowness of the legal reasoning. The Court of 
Appeal persistently disengaged from elaborating a view about the politics of copyright law. 
The reality was that both Justice Patel's and Boies et al's approaches had historical support. 
However as both positions were arguable, legal authority could only endorse one, by not 
honestly engaging with the other. A legalistic approach was sought to provide closure to the 
reality of multifaceted legal and social relations. Here legal authority is vested in singularity.
This approach energised many technological challenges to legal authority. Developers would 
seek to outsmart overbearing and unsympathetic regulation. Gnutella, Madster/Aimster, 
Grokster, Morpheus, KazaA, FreeNet and numerous other peer to peer systems provide 
different technological frameworks and legal issues. For some the desire was to render law 
irrelevant and redundant through technological innovation. In an interview for Spin magazine 
Freenet's creator, Ian Clarke, explained his motivations:
"Milner: You've called Freenet "a near perfect form of anarchy". Given how 
enormous the Internet has become, is online anarchy such a good idea?
Clarke: By "perfect" I mean a well-planned, decentralized system. There are a 
lot of people now who have a stake in trying to control the Internet, so it's 
important to build systems that have no central control. If you look at Napster, 
for example, there are people who have central control, which means legal 
action can be taken against them. The owners of Napster could be bribed into 
selling it to the music industry. In order to make Freenet immune to that, I 
designed it so that it doesn't depend on any one person or computer. I don't 
control it. If somebody put a gun to my head and said: "Shut down the system",
I'd be unable to do it" [57].
Here regulation of any form is seen as bad. Regulation hinders innovation because it "knows 
best" by seeking to control the development, and furthering some interests at the expense of 
others. Developers think they know best, and if they're right, users will rush to take up the 
technology.
For others investing in peer to peer, the desire is more entrepreneurial:
"John Borland: What made you decide to buy Kazaa? What are your plans for
Sharman?
Nikki Hemming: ... my investors had been looking at opportunities in the 
Internet field. ... The company was actually started for the purpose of 
investment in Internet opportunities ...
Q: Were you able to shield yourself legally when you bought the original assets?
You're not being sued at this point.
A: ... obviously we were extremely pleased in March when the Dutch courts 
ruled that the KMD (software), which we owned, and the way that software 
functioned, was not infringing on copyrights in any way.
Yes, there is a risky profile, and I think that is the reality check of a new 
paradigm. If you are operating on the frontier, and you're operating as a driver 
in changes in technology, consumer behavior, and in what the commercial 
model looks like, then there are always inherent risks ..." [58].
The RIAA has threatened or initiated legal actions against many peer to peer developers, 
anarchist and entrepreneurial alike [59].
What is disturbing is the way the courts have permitted the RIAA to use law in a strategic 
fashion to control developments. Though given the opportunity to take control by judging peer
to peer technologies in terms of the broad foundations or objectives of copyright law, the 
courts have declined that challenge. Judicial passivity has played into the RIAA's hands, 
forestalling "unauthorised" peer to peer development, bankrupting companies backing them, 
and helping maintain the technologies as tools of the hacking underground. It is worth noting 
that the plaintiff's commercial peer to peer systems, much lauded by Justice Patel, are still not
operating in any significant fashion.
Nonetheless, Jessica Litman anticipates that the public will continue to ignore and resist the 
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legal regulation of their online practices:
"People don't obey laws they don't believe in. Governments find it difficult to 
enforce laws that only a handful of people obey. Laws that people don't obey 
and that governments don't enforce are not much use to interests that 
persuaded Congress to enact them. If a law is bad enough, even its proponents 
might be willing to abandon it in favor of a different law that seems more 
legitimate to the people it is intended to command" [60].
The glut of copyright lawsuits coupled with a submissive judiciary will only encourage more 
civil disobedience. Burdensome prescriptions and draconian penalties will harm the legitimacy 
of copyright law, and will foster non-compliance amongst large numbers of the population.
 
Part Two - The DMCA Litigation: DeCSS and Beyond
In the United States, Australia and elsewhere copyright owners were successful in creating 
new copyright offences - related to circumventing technological protection (anti-circumvention
provisions) [61] and disseminating decryption tools that could disable or avoid technical 
protection measures (anti-trafficking provisions) [62]. The provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) have been soundly criticised for a lack of balance:
"... by colorful use of high rhetoric and forceful lobbying, Hollywood and its allies 
were successful in persuading Congress to adopt the broad anti-circumvention 
legislation they favoured ...
Had the Administration sought to broker a fairer compromise between the 
interests of Hollywood and its allies and the interests of Silicon Valley and its 
allies, this process would almost certainly have produced better legislation than 
the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA" [63].
It is argued that the provisions exceeded WIPO requirements, were at odds with the broader 
stated policy of devising laws that foster a "predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple" 
e-commerce environment [64] and facilitated a "certain established but frightened copyright 
industries'" control over the design and manufacture of information technologies that can 
process digital information [65].
The anti-circumvention provisions can certainly be explained in terms of the wielding of 
political influence at the U.S. Congressional level. However beyond that kind of political 
explanation of the law, there is the politics played out in the way that copyright law has 
engaged with the new legal category and associated rights and restrictions. "Hollywood" 
couched the need for reform in terms of saving capital from seeping away through leaky 
digital pipelines:
"The protection of America's creative works is as "old as the Constitution." 
Valenti noted that a simple way to protect creative works is to "deploy 
technology protection shields ... on the World Wide Web. Technology provides a 
coded lock on the door to which entry is allowed only when permission is 
granted by the copyright owner." ... He cautioned that if intellectual property is 
"vulnerable to poachers, through unauthorized entry or copying, if they are not 
protected by simple, firm, clearly stated rules of the game, then ... we will laugh
loudly at our folly in the years to come" [66].
However the reforms did far more than simply provide for "locks" to protect content from 
"poachers". It transformed the nature of copyright existing in relation to copy-protected 
content. It created entirely new legal relations with respect to this subject matter, at odds 
with established rights and limitations. This can been seen in some of the high profile litigation 
enforcing the new rights.
2600 Case
In the 2600 case [67] eight U.S motion picture studios sued the defendants to prevent them 
electronically linking their site to others where the DeCSS code could be obtained. DeCSS is 
designed to decrypt the CSS encryption system on DVD players and allows a copy of the DVD 
file to be stored.
Rather than sue the offshore creator of the DeCSS code, the litigation targeted a few of many 
hundreds who had published information about the cracked code. The main defendant was 
eventually settled as Eric Corley. He was relatively well known in hacker communities by his 
Orwellian pseudonym, Emmanuel Goldstein. His profile stemmed from his ongoing 
involvement with the magazine 2600: The Hacker Quarterly founded in 1984, and the related 
Web site [68]. 2600 Enterprises Inc was also joined as a defendant. The choice of 2600 as a 
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litigant was not accidental. As many commentators liked to explain, the name 2600 was 
derived from the fact that hackers in the 1960's found that the transmission of a 2600 hertz 
tone over a long distance trunk connection gained access to "operator" mode and allowed the 
user to explore aspects of the telephone system that were not otherwise accessible. 2600 had
published articles on such topics as how to steal an Internet domain name, access other 
people's e-mail, intercept cellular phone calls, and break into the computer systems at Costco 
stores and Federal Express. The eight U.S. motion pictures wanted a high-profile target to test
the rules regarding anti-circumvention devices. They also sought to tap into public discourse 
about hackers as copyright pirates, criminals, and spreaders of computer viruses [69].
At the District Court Justice Kaplan found that, by first publishing the code on the 2600 site 
and also by hyperlinking from the 2600 site to other sites where it could be downloaded, 2600
was responsible for "trafficking" in copyright circumvention devices. He rejected the 
arguments of the defendants that the posting was legitimate in order to facilitate exercise of 
fair use rights, for example to facilitate the making of Linux compatible DVD players. First 
Amendment objections were also rejected [70]. These findings were affirmed on appeal [71].
Prior to the DMCA the dominion granted owners can be represented as follows:
 
Figure 1: Copyright relationships pre-DMCA
Illustration by L. Sharp
 
Copyright locates legal rights to cultural production within a system of interdependencies. It is
not really the case that copyright creates two competing domains - private and public. There 
is no private "domain" in a closed sense. The boundaries that exist are permeable. This is 
because ownership is determined by overlapping cultural limitations that express the realities 
of that copyrightable work's genesis, and enable similar relations with other cultural producers
to the benefit of cultural production generally. For example, fair use, taking of insubstantial 
parts, taking ideas but not the expression, and limits to the duration of protection all interrupt 
the owner's "domain". There are no "walls" around the copyrightable work in that property 
sense.
Nonetheless, in explaining the new rights under the DMCA, the courts make reference to the 
need to "target the circumvention of digital walls" [72]. This implies that the effect of the 
DMCA is to harden the membrane surrounding the copyrightable work, that is, to make an 
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Figure 2: Copyright relationships post-DMCA
Illustration by L. Sharp
 
The work itself remains defined in copyright terms in the same manner as previously, and it is
not that work's boundary that is changed by the DMCA. Rather under the DMCA the 
copyrightable work, once encrypted, is housed within a protective cocoon. It is the cocoon 
that does not allow for fair use in the ordinary sense [73], or other forms of dealings with the 
work, where decryption is required to enable access. "Defence" of the copyrightable work has 
led to the creation of an ancillary set of legal relations to do with the encryption process as a 
separate entity, unrelated to dealings with the encrypted content in the conventional 
infringing sense.
The owner's encryption code is actually protected functionally distinct from its relation with 
the copyrightable work. Through the new provisions, part of the owner's dominion now relates
to controlling the ability of anyone to develop and disseminate code that is functionally 
equivalent to the owner's own decryption code, whether or not that decryption code infringes 
the owner's code in its expression, and regardless of the reason for the development or use of
this "original" code. Thus the effect of the provisions is to create a monopoly that relates to 
the function of the owner's code [74]. This is radically at odds with copyright principles as 
historically established where, especially in relation to computer code, courts have strived to 
limit owner's rights to the expression and avoid monopolisation of the idea or function of the 
program. Under the DMCA encryption codes stand apart from any other code, because of their
usefulness to owners.
Further in interpreting a hyperlink to decryption code as encapsulating a form of "trafficking", 
the owner's dominion now extends far beyond any form of dealing with the protected content 
or the copyright work that is the encryption code. The provision restrains broader 
communications about this form of useful code. It thus entails a prohibition with respect to an 
area of discourse where that involves technical specificity about encryption codes. In this 
context, it is unsurprising that on appeal the discussion focussed on First Amendment 
arguments.
The appeal was supported by eight amicae briefs. In support of this strategy there was also a 
rise in the circulation of academic arguments about software as a form of expressive speech 
or dialogue, in an attempt to disrupt the current legal approach that sees technology as a 
functional tool or instrument in the service of a particular interest to found more a more 
permissive attitude to technological development and communications [75].
However, the courts were reluctant to accept such academic arguments. Justice Kaplan denied
that the DMCA should be read in the context of constitutional arguments about freedom of 
speech. He offered this stinging rebuke:
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"Society must be able to regulate the use and dissemination of code in 
appropriate circumstances. The Constitution, after all, is a framework for 
building a just and democratic society. It is not a suicide pact" [76].
On appeal, Justice Newman showed a greater delicacy in disposing of the constitutional 
arguments about the First Amendment. His Honour stressed that the Court faced an 
unpalatable, inescapable choice:
"This reality obliges courts considering First Amendment claims in the context of
the pending case to choose between two unattractive alternatives: either 
tolerate some impairment of communication in order to permit Congress to 
prohibit decryption that may lawfully be prevented, or tolerate some decryption 
in order to avoid some impairment of communication" [77].
In the end, Justice Newman stressed that the issues of public policy were best left to be 
solved by legislative response. His Honour was reluctant to consider whether the injunction 
was inconsistent with the limitations of the First Amendment.
Neither Justices Kaplan and Newman took up the issue of the relation between §1201 and
copyright law generally. The cultural considerations associated with copyright and assumed in 
its principles and logic, were only addressed in terms of a brief discussion of the relation 
between §107 and §1201, and then suspended. Justice Kaplan found:
"The policy concerns raised by defendants were considered by Congress. Having
considered them, Congress crafted a statute that, so far as the applicability of 
the fair use defense to Section 1201(a) claims is concerned, is crystal clear. In 
such circumstances, courts may not undo what Congress so plainly has done by 
"construing" the words of a statute to accomplish a result that Congress 
rejected ... " [78].
Justice Newman argued Congress had taken a "balanced approach" to fair use [79]. He also 
concluded "We need not explore the extent to which fair use might have constitutional 
protection ... such matters are far beyond the scope of this lawsuit" [80]. He found 
deficiencies in the defendant's claims and evidence justified his lack of consideration of further 
issues.
Thus Congress has determined the national priority as generally favouring protection over 
access rights, despite conceding some limited exceptions. This is taken as dispensing with the 
"management" of the cultural agenda of copyright. There is no perceived need to relate the 
new section to the body of law within which it is situated. Reasoning techniques such as 
references to inadequate evidence being brought by the defendant, or references to the 
alleged problem not arising in this factual situation, or technical issues of matters being in 
footnotes of the amicus brief, are used to "manage" the inconsistency.
There is thus continuity in judicial approach to that outlined regarding the Napster case. The 
"national" concern for "piracy" provides the narrative and justification for the decision to the 
extent to which these are elaborated. There is really only an external justification for the new 
provisions enacted by Congress. However this politics materializes in a new internal 
rationalisation for copyright law. In the treatment of "owner's rights" coherent legal definition 
is substituted by reference to metaphor. The historical reality of copyright as a limited and 
interdependent right is cast out by reference to a newly reified version - the "walled" work. 
This metaphor suffices as the new inner logic of the law. Law can "get by" with this sketchy 
analysis, by drawing upon both the expectation and experience of legal reasoning acting in the
service of capital, the "terror" of piracy erasing the possibility of a real competing claim.
The creative reinvention of the owner's domain creates a kind of monopoly in certain prized 
codes previously unknown to copyright and extends the owner's reach to activities far beyond 
direct or indirect dealings with protected content or distribution of infringing works. But 
scrutiny of the awkward fit of these new relations within the body of copyright law is averted 
by narrowing the judicial focus to particular technical matters, not requiring reference to the 
broader purposes, aims of principles of copyright law.
It can be argued that it is necessary to avoid this kind of legal inquiry in deference to the 
superior will of Congress. However even if that is so, that political reasoning will lose its 
relevance to the law with time. At that stage what will be referred to as the new 
jurisprudential grounding of these provisions? Will it mean copyright comes to have two 
conflicting paths - one set of legal relations defining non-encrypted content, and entirely 
different ones where encryption is involved? Judicial unwillingness to engage with the broader 
issues underlying the 2600 case could be explained in terms of judicial uncertainty about the 
future paths of the law. Who would want to claim authorship over a fractured body of law?
The Sony Hacker Challenge
That owners see their protected domain as including communications of a particular subject 
matter, and no longer in terms of works per se, can be seen from Ed Felten's case. Ed Felten 
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took part in a Sony-sponsored hacker challenge, where a $US10,000 prize was on offer to 
anyone who could successfully document how to break the Secure Digital Music Initiative code
(SDMI) [81]. Felten, Professor of Computing Science at Princeton University, succeeded, but 
he was not happy with the conditions of accepting the prize money, especially the 
confidentiality clause. As an academic he wished to discuss the code and his experience in 
breaking it. He proposed to give a paper on the subject at a conference. Under threat of legal 
action by the RIAA he elected not to give the paper, but sued the RIAA seeking a declaration 
that he was entitled to submit his paper to an academic conference without violating the 
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.
Unlike the 2600 case, here the affected party was a middle aged respectable academic 
seeking to participate in regular academic life in accordance with the established scientific 
practices of peer review and debate. It was argued that encryption experts and teachers 
needed to be free to discuss their skills and codes in order for better tools to be invented. 
Corporations are likely to sell "secure" packages but will never publicly disclose weaknesses. 
There is no reason to believe that the products will always perform as claimed in 
advertisements, or offer the best solution that is currently available. The public will end up 
being deceived and ignorantly trust insecure technologies in the absence of appropriate 
scientific review of such technologies.
The RIAA sought to have the action dismissed, arguing that it had no problem with Felten's 
paper. It had a strategic interest in stopping this action, because of the strong free speech 
concerns. Justice Garrett Brown of the District Court of New Jersey dismissed the action: "The 
plaintiffs liken themselves to modern Galileos persecuted by authorities. I fear that a more apt
analogy would be to modern day Don Quixotes feeling threatened by windmills that they 
perceive as giants" [82]. His Honour stressed that the defendants should pursue their 
"political, rather than a legal concern" in the legislature [83].
Citing assurances from the government, the recording industry, and a federal court that the 
threats against his research team were ill-conceived and will not be repeated, Edward Felten 
and his research team decided not to appeal the November dismissal of their case by a New 
Jersey Federal Court [84]. The government stated in documents filed with the court in 
November 2001 that "scientists attempting to study access control technologies" are not 
subject to the DMCA [85]. The RIAA echoed this, stating "we felt Felten should publish his 
findings, because everyone benefits from research into the vulnerabilities of security 
mechanisms" [86]. Princeton Professor Ed Felten said, "Although we would have preferred an 
enforceable court ruling, our research team decided to take the government and industry at 
their word that they will never again threaten publishers of scientific research that exposes 
vulnerabilities in security systems for copyrighted works" [87].
§1201(g) permits encryption research aimed at identifying flaws in encryption technology if
the research is conducted to advance the state of knowledge in the field. It is not yet clear 
whether those seeking to rely on the provision only have to fulfil a "genuine purpose" test, or 
whether the provision is also "status driven". Does research that "advance(s) the state of 
knowledge of the field" have to come from an acknowledged research institute? Felten, as a 
reputable researcher with established links with an elite educational institution had no problem
passing either genuine purpose or status tests. It seems more doubtful that contributors to 
2600, where postings expose flaws in encryption, would be entitled to the same protection
under §1201(g), because of the different social relations their communications enable [88]. If 
this is correct, then it seems the fair use exception establishes the majority as non-persons 
with regard to fair use, but privileges the few that limit their communications and activities to 
a "recognized" forum. You have to be a card-carrying member of the establishment, and 
confine your talk to those circles, if you want to break the code.
Taking heed of the advice of the courts, copyright users have pressed the Congress with their 
political concerns. Democrat Congressman Rick Boucher has proven to be sympathetic to the 
plight of Professor Felten [89]. He has called for a revision and rewriting of the DMCA. 
Boucher maintains that the defence of fair use should apply notwithstanding the technological 
measures provisions [90]. The Congressman also believes that Congress should reaffirm the 
principles of fair use in other specific areas - such as parallel importation, musical sampling, 
space-shifting, and making back-up copies of copyrighted data. However such reforms have 
thus far been disregarded and disdained.
 
Part Three - Dmitry, the Con and the Constitution
In the wake of the DMCA, copyright owners have not been content to rest upon their laurels. 
Senior Democrat Congressman Fritz Hollings has introduced the Consumer Broadband and 
Digital Television Promotion Act of 2002 into Congress [91]. Essentially, the bill would prohibit 
the sale or distribution of any technology unless it featured copy-protection standards set by 
the U.S. government [92]. Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association of America supports 
the Hollings Bill, calling it "a measure that will serve the long-term interests of consumers by 
Bowrey http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArt...
15 of 21 8/11/2008 9:05 AM
calling upon the Information Technology, Consumer Electronics and Copyright industries to 
negotiate in good faith to find solutions to digital piracy" [93]. The bill seeks to force 
manufacturers to embed technological measures in software and consumer electronics. In 
other words, it is a renewal of the battle between Hollywood and Silicon Valley, as noted by 
Pamela Samuelson [94].
The Hollings Bill has been greeted with some scepticism. The Bush administration has been 
quiet about the plan [95]. Copyright users are slowly becoming roused. As Declan McCullagh 
observes: "America's programmers, engineers and sundry bit-heads have not yet figured out 
how much a new copyright bill will affect their livelihood. When they do, watch for an angry 
Million Geek March to storm Capital Hill" [96].
In the meantime, copyright owners have continued to rely upon the DMCA in concerted legal 
action. The pattern of litigation is not accidental. Copyright owners have been targeting 
hackers on purpose because they are pushing a wider public agenda about stopping piracy. 
Furthermore, they are confident that their opponents have limited scope to make arguments 
about freedom of speech. The long-term strategy is for copyright owners to win favourable 
interpretations of the DMCA, which they can later assert against more formidable opponents - 
such as the computer software and consumer electronics industries.
A recent decision denying a motion to dismiss the indictment of Elcom Ltd. [97], the 
Russian-based employer of computer programmer Dmitry Sklyarov, for offences against
§1201, demonstrates continuity with the 2600 jurisprudence, and a refinement of that 
approach. Rather than acknowledge the creativity inherent in the provisions of the DMCA and 
the radical impact on existing jurisprudence, the court projects a facade of continuity with 
pre-DMCA law.
This legal action was initiated when Dmitry Sklyarov came to the U.S. to give a paper at 
"Defcon 9", an annual hacking convention. Sklyarov was author of the Advanced eBook 
Processor code (AEBPR), which was software that decrypted Adobe eBook files, turning them 
into standard PDF format files, free of eBook licence restrictions. Whilst the AEBPR software 
was legal in Russia, it could be purchased online and thereby was available to consumers in 
the United States. Sklyarov speech was about the poor security utilised in protecting 
electronic books and documents. He was arrested in the United States and has the dubious 
honour of being the first person indicted under the trafficking provisions of §1201. Later
Sklyarov was released from custody and allowed to return to Russia in exchange for testimony
in proceedings against Elcom Ltd. The lawsuit is continuing with Elcom Ltd as the main 
defendant.
The constitutional challenge to the indictment highlighted concerns about the effect of the 
trafficking provision §1201(b) on fair use. The ban with respect to circumvention tools went
too far, it was argued, because the section prevented any access to circumvention devices 
making it impossible to exercise traditional fair use rights. Fair uses are being treated by the 
legislation as if they were all infringing uses. It was argued that the provision was bad 
because it was unconstitutionally vague, constituted a content-based restriction on speech not
sufficiently tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and that Congress exceeded 
constitutional power in enacting the DMCA [98].
In rejected these complaints Justice Whyte argued that §1201(b) deliberately targeted
trafficking, and not the use of circumvention tools per se, and this was a concession to protect
fair use rights:
"Congress did not prohibit the act of circumvention because it sought to 
preserve the fair use rights of person who had lawfully acquired a work" [99].
He acknowledged that "engaging in certain fair uses of digital works may be made more 
difficult if tools to circumvent use restrictions cannot be readily obtained" [100]. However he 
argued the provision was not vague in relation to what tools were banned.
Justice Whyte recognised computer code as speech under the First Amendment, but found
that §1201(b) did not target speech. It targeted devices: "Congress sought to ban the code
not because of what the code says, but rather because of what the code does" [101]. He 
rejected the notion that it was impossible to regulate the functional aspects of the code 
without regulating the expressive (constitutionally protected) content of the code because:
"Divorcing the function from the message, however, is precisely what the courts
have done in other contexts, for example, in determining what portions of code 
are protectable by copyright and what uses of that same code are permitted as 
fair uses" [102].
The test of constitutionality was not "strict", because the code had both functional and 
expressive components, and the restrictions promoted a substantial government interest. It 
was a legitimate governmental interest to protect the "thriving electronic marketplace" from 
"the plague of digital piracy" [103].
That the provisions did not burden speech more than is necessary was evident from the 
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existence of the statutory exceptions. Further broader fair uses than those contained in the 
exceptions remained, because fair use itself was not banned, only devices that might enable 
it:
"Nothing prevents anyone from quoting from a work or comparing texts for 
purpose of study or criticism. It may be that from a technological perspective, 
the fair user m(a)y find it more difficult to do so - quoting may have to occur 
the old fashioned way, by hand or by re-typing, rather than by "cutting and 
pasting" from existing digital media. Nevertheless, the fair use is still available. 
Defendant has cited no authority which guarantees a fair user the right to the 
most technologically convenient way to engage in fair use" [104].
Further public domain works are not affected by the DMCA even though, via encryption, rights
to control a digital copy of such an unprotected work might arise. Public domain works, 
copyrighted works and fair use all exist with the same legal status as previously.
This characterisation is a con. Whilst legal relations continue as previously when rights and 
categories are viewed abstractly and independently, the DMCA disrupts the interrelationships 
copyright has traditionally maintained. That on paper the old categories of exclusive rights
(§106) and fair use (§107) still exist with the same legal definition does not mean that they
are the "same" rights, when viewed in the context of the interrelation between legal 
categories. Via the protection §1201 confers, §106 rights are enhanced, because §107 rights
cannot be meaningfully exercised without access to the locks that stand between works and 
prospective users.
It is possible to recreate a digital quotation of a literary work, but it is not so obvious how one 
is to reproduce more digitally sophisticated forms of expression such as artistic works, sound 
recordings or films. Fair use did not traditionally require "re-creation" of an original effort, 
although this process was certainly permitted. Fair use permitted duplication of certain 
portions for appropriate purposes. Duplication is now denied, regardless of the amount taken 
or reason for the taking, unless the user falls within one of the "special status" exceptions. 
Thus the problem for ordinary fair users, especially in relation to works other than literary 
works, is much greater than one of the DMCA creating mere technological inconvenience 
making the exercise of their fair use rights "more difficult".
It is a further ruse to deflect criticism of the concern for burdening the expressive content of 
code by reference to the copyright practice of "divorcing the function from the message". It is 
true that copyright law has established a distinction between the (unprotected) function of the
code and the (copyrightable) expression. However as discussed above, the code in issue here 
- encryption code - was explicitly excluded from these kinds of relations. The point of §1201
was to catch functional code, but not for the usual copyright case of keeping access to 
function free of copyright. Thus whether jurisprudence about not protecting functional code 
provides any guidance in identifying and protecting "expressive code" is highly questionable. 
The existing jurisprudence simply does not illustrate how expressive code remains free under
§1201(b).
So far, even when responding to constitutional arguments, the courts have elided discussion 
of the politics of digital copyright law, except through referral to Congress. The creative 
invention of new relations of "protection", out of step with the existing jurisprudence, has 
been largely denied. The courts have consistently rejected the notion that there are any 
significant "internal" housekeeping matters to consider, and close the possibility of reconciling 
the old law with the new provisions.
In the cases discussed it is widely anticipated that the "thriving electronic marketplace" will 
blossom due to the thoughtfulness of Congress and the usefulness of the DMCA provisions. 
Perhaps the fancy (or fantasy) is of suspending any practical discussion of status of the old 
rights and hiding the incoherency the DMCA has produced, in expectation that hard copies and
unencrypted versions will soon be replaced by certified, secure, protected copies [105]. Then 
a new copyright logic can emerge and supplant the older, "lesser" rights and confounding 
limitations on the owner's dominion.
In face of the current judicial intransigence, a move towards constitutional arguments to 
defeat the politics of the court, such as the assertion of fair use as a constitutional right, is 
understandable. However to date, so far as the DMCA provisions are concerned, the courts 
have also ignored the essence of that challenge.
It is worth noting that the courts have been happier to engage the emerging constitutional 
jurisprudence in relation to "cultural" arguments [106]. It could be argued that, in spite of the 
much vaunted ideal of technological neutrality, the courts are discriminating between different
forms of media. Judges are relatively comfortable in considering matters of freedom of speech
in the context of the act of publishing recognised literary works. However, they display a much
greater degree of hesitancy in applying constitutional notions of freedom of speech to 
exclusively digital media and modes of distribution - reflecting deep seated doubts as to 
whether computer code is equivalent to "literary" expression.
There may be something to "owner" calculation of the weaknesses of the free speech 
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defences. In touting free speech as a superior body of law to the DMCA, and in developing the
notion of free speech as an interior cultural motivation underpinning copyright, an analysis of 
the status of more conventional copyright principles seem to have fallen by the wayside. 
Incontestable copyright concerns such as for the idea/expression dichotomy, substantial part, 
limited terms and fair use, can, of course, be related to a free speech story. However they 
need not be. The apparent removal of these from current jurisprudence requires judicial 
account. Academic lawyers should be mindful of this conventional jurisprudential detail, and 
not allow it to be lost in the intellectual excitement of leading "emerging" jurisprudence, in a 
highly charged litigation context. Resistance to the new copyright status quo is particularly 
difficult, given law's deference to the service of capital. An overemphasis on "free speech", 
where there are doubts about the character of the "speech", pitches a weak notion of "culture"
against a strong, established but "vulnerable" notion of economy. Law can step in, in the 
service of the economy, to prevent "oppressive" and "unproductive" economic activity, but 
here "culture" runs interference in identifying the source of real economic oppression.
 
Part Four - Some Questions about Law, Politics, and the Politics Of Law
To date the authoritative story of peer to peer and the DMCA has shown:
reliance on legal authority vested in a singular perspective of the issues (the Napster 
experience);
refusal to engage with the implications of digital protection, outside of a one-sided 
preoccupation with the "culture" of "piracy" (The 2600 case); and,
a misleading assertion of jurisprudential continuity under the DMCA (Elcom Ltd).
Challenging this politics requires exposure of the law's mismanagement of cultural diversity 
and technological change. But in working towards this goal and the dislodging of the "new" 
legal status quo, it would be helpful not to repeat the same mistake of "ripping, mixing and 
burning" the jurisprudence.
The "continuity" and "coherence" needs of copyright law can be approached in the spirit of 
keeping the same questions alive, rather than pretending to invoke the authority of past 
answers. Answers for these times can be tested in light of their implications for diverse 
cultures. This differs from U.S. Congressional politics, in that there is a guardianship role for 
lawyers, committed to understanding past legal wisdom and not abandoning this wisdom too 
lightly, hearing all sides of the debate. That views on what is wise, and what is surplus, to law 
will differ is to be expected, and not feared, as currently, as a source of failure for law. The 
best that can ever be expected of law is an honest and reasoned engagement with what was, 
and what is, at stake.
At present, some of the better academic literature seems to pursue this kind of legal politics. 
Further the "end game" behind the current constitutional challenges to copyright law could be 
read in terms of a desire for a more open jurisprudence than is currently experienced. 
However when the arguments are readied for court, at face value they are more commonly 
expressed in terms of a closed and flattened jurisprudence. Perhaps this is because it is the 
language that the court system craves. However if this is the case, academic focus needs to 
move far beyond a questioning the politics of the U.S. Congress, peer to peer and the DMCA, 
and more firmly direct critical attention to the chosen jurisprudence of the courts. 
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